Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2016

State of Utah, Plaintiff/ Appellee, v. Robert Morgan Magness,
Defendant/ Appellant.
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v Magness, No. 20150417 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2016).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3615

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Case No. 20150417-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff!Appellee,

v.
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS,
Defen41mt/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
Appeal from denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea to
forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony, in the Third
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Elizabeth
Hruby-Mills, presiding
MARIAN DECKER (5688)

CR/2.IG S. COOK

Assistant Attorney General
SEAN D. REYES (7969)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180

Craig S. Cook, PC
3645 East Cascade Way
Salt Lake City, Ut_ah 84109

District Atton1ey's Office

Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Appellee

AARON FLATER

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JAN 2 6 2016
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Case No. 20150417-CA
INTHE

UT AH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS,

Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
Appeal from denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea to
forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony, in the Third
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Elizabeth
Hruby-Mills, presiding
(5688)
Assistant Attorney General
SEAN D. REYES (7969)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
MARIAN DECKER

CRAIG S. COOK

Craig S. Cook, PC
3645 East Cascade Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

District Attorney's Office

Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Appellee

AARON FLATER

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii
ST ATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........................................................................ 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ................................................................................ 1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES ...................... 2
ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................ 3

A. Summary of facts ........................................................................................ 3
B. Summary of proceedings .......................................................................... 3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................................. 12
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 13

I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA WHERE IT IS
UNCONTROVERTED THAT DEFENDANT KNEW AND
UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PROSECUTOR'S
RECOMMENDATION OF NO PRISON TIME WAS
CONTINGENT ON THE VICTIM'S WISHES AT SENTENCING ......... 13

A. Because the prosecutor's pre-plea representation of the
victim's sentencing wishes were not material, Defendant
cannot show that his plea was fraudulently induced or
unknowing and involuntary .................................................................. 15
B. Defendant shows no clear error in the trial court's findings
that any misrepresentation of the victim's initial sentencing
wishes was unintentional. ....................................................................... 20
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 23

-iDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDA
Addendum A: R364 (Change of Plea Hearing);
R147-53 (Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty
Plea and Certificate of Counsel)
Addendum B:

R365 (Sentencing Hearing)

Addendum C: R233-34 (Motion for Leave to Withdraw Guilty Plea and
Stay Sentencing Proceedings);
R323-24 (Amended Motion for Leave to Withdraw
Guilty Plea, Reinstate Preliminary Hearing, and
Reinstate All Prior Filed Motions and Requests);
R306-19 (Memorandum in Support of Motions to
Withdraw Guilty Plea, Reinstate Preliminary Hearing,
and Reinstate All Prior Filed Motions and Requests)
R244-55 (Larry Long Affidavit)
R256-67 (Shawn Kane Affidavit)
R268-73 (Defendant Affidavit)
Addendum D: R329-33 (State's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea)
Addendum E: R366 (Oral Argument)
Addendum F: R339-341 (Ruling and Order)
Addendum G: R343-46 (Motion to Clarify Ruling and Order on
Defendant's Motions to Withdraw Guilty Plea,
Reinstate Preliminary Hearing, and Reinstate All Prior
Filed Motions and Requests)
Addendum H: R367 (Sentencing Hearing);
R356-57 (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment)

-ii- Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES

Brady v. Man1land, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) .................................................................. 18
United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2nd Cir. 1998) ...................................... 18
STATE CASES

Despain v. Despain, 855 P.2d 254 (Utah App. 1993) ..................................... 16, 18
Otsuka Electronics (USA, Inc.) v. Imaging Specialists, Inc.,
937 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1997) .............................................................. 16, 18

State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, 279 P.3d 371. ...................................................... 15
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) ................................................ 19, 21
State v. Gladney, 951 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1998) ................................................ 15
State v. Knowlden, 2013 UT App 63, 298 P.3d 691 ................................................ 2
State v. Ruiz, 2013 UT App 274, 316 P.3d 984 ....................................................... 2
Steinberg v. CommunihJ Housing Services-Capitol Villa, Ltd.,
2014 UT App 102, 326 P.3d 673 ..................................................................... 22
STATE STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-402 (West 2015) ................................................................ 3
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-404 (West 2015) ................................................................ 3
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (West Supp. 2015-16 ............................................ 8, 15
Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103 (West Supp. 2012) ................................................. 1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
-iii- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Case No. 20150417-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS,

Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea to forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony. This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Aim. §78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2012).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Defendant was charged with rape. He negotiated a plea bargain in
which he would plead guilty to a reduced charge of forcible sexual abuse
and the prosecutor would recommend no prison time. But the prosecutor
expressly conditioned his sentencing recom1nendation on what the victim
wanted at sentencing:

"Our recommendation is simply that we would

honor the victim's wishes. If the victim were asking for a prison sentence,
we' re not bound to not recommend prison. If the victhn is not seeking a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

prison sentence we will not go beyond her request." The prosecutor told
Defendant that he believed that the victim was not seeking prison time, but
explained that he had not talked to her since the initial intake and had not
discussed the plea agreement with her.
At sentencing, the victim asked the trial court to impose a prison
sentence. Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that the
prosecutor had intentionally misrepresented the victim's initial position in
order to induce his guilty plea.

Issue: Did the trial court properly deny Defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea where it is uncontroverted that Defendant knew
and

understood- before

he

pleaded

guilty- that

the

prosecutor's

recommendation for no prison time was contingent on the victim's wishes
at sentencing?

Standard of Review. A trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Ruiz, 2013 UT App
274,

ifl2, 316 P.3d 984; State v. Knowlden, 2013 UT App 63, ,12, 298 P.3d 691.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are qiscussed
as pertinent in the body of this brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary off acts. 1
Defendant's son and three other friends, including the female victim,

M.C., partied one night at Defendant's house.

M.C. eventually went to

sleep on a bed in Defendant's basement. She awakened to find Defendant
on top of her with his penis in her vagina. M.C. jumped up and demanded
that Defendant get away from her.
When Defendant talked to investigating officers, he said that he only
touched M.C.'s shoulder. State investigators performed DNA analysis on
seminal fluid collected from M.C.'s Code Rexam and found that it matched
Defendant's DNA profile.
B.

Summary of proceedings.
Defendant was charged with rape, a first degree felony, Utah Code

Ann. §76-5-402 (West 2015). Rl. Under a plea bargain, Defendant pleaded
guilty to forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony, Utah Code Ann. §765-404 (West 2015). R158-59;R154-55;R147-53.
At the plea hearing, the prosecutor told the trial court that he had
spoken to M.C. "initially during intake," and that M.C.'s "first impression"
1

Because Defendant pleaded guilty, the facts are taken from the
Amended Infonnation and Defendant's "Memorandum in Support of
Motions to Withdraw Guilty .Pleas, Reinstate Preliminary Hearing, and
Reinstate All Prior Filed Motions and Requests." See R159,R306-07.

-3-
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was that "she was not seeking prison at the time and was fairly amenable to
resolving the case." R364:3 (Addendum A). But the prosecutor added that
he had been unable to contact M.C. since negotiating the plea agreement
with the defense. Id.
The trial court conducted a rule 11 colloquy with Defendant, and,
after finding that Defendant's guilty plea was both knowing and voluntary,
authorized Defendant to sign his "Statement of Defendant in Support of
Guilty Plea" (Statement)

R364:7-8; see also R147-53 (Addendum A).

Defendant's signed Statement set forth the basis for the parties' agreement:
"In exchange for the Defendant's plea of guilty the prosecution agrees that
in the event the victim does not affirmatively insist upon the prosecutor
seeking a prison commitment that the prosecutor will recommend
probation and no prison." R150.
Defense counsel also stated on the record that the prosecutor had
agr~ed to recommend probation "unless the victim affirmatively requests a
commitment of prison for the defendant's behavior."

R364:8.

The

prosecutor affirmed defense counsel's characterization of the parties'
agree1nent:

"Our recommendation is simply that we would honor the

victim's wishes. If the victim were asking for a prison sentence, we' re not
bound to not recommend prison.

If the victim is not seeking a prison

-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sentence, we will not go beyond her request."

Id.

Defense counsel

concurred: "We recognize the same." Id.
The trial court asked if Defendant understood that the court was

✓/not

bound by any such recommendation as well?" Counsel responded, "That is
correct."

Id.

The trial court then set a sentencing date, and instructed

Defendant "to get down to AP&P to get a pre-sentence report." R364:9-10.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel moved to continue, filed a
defense-based sentencing report, and requested an evidentiary hearing.
R365:2-3 (Addendum B). The defense motions were prompted by receipt of
the AP&P report. R365:3. The trial court agreed to continue sentencing and
to hold an evidentiary hearing. R365:6-9. The trial court also allowed M.C.
to make a statement:
.... I am asking the Judge to sentence you to two-and-ahalf years in prison, the same sentence you've dealt n1e, the
prison I've been in waiting for this to be over. I also want you
to be on the sexual offender's list, so there's a possibility a girl
might see it and think twice about being in a vulnerable
position in your presence, even if it is under the pretense of
partying with your 20-something-year-old son.
R365:9.
Before the next hearing, Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty
plea; he filed a supporting memorandum.

See R233-36,323-24,306-19

(Addendum C). The defense also filed supporting affidavits from-one of

-5-
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Defendant's attorneys-Larry Long, a defense investigator, and Defendant.

See R244-273 (Addendum C).

According to Long's affidavit, he had

intended to cross examine M.C. at the preliminary hearing about "her
consumption of alcohol during the evening," and "her sexual relations" the
morning of the rape. R246. He had also intended to cross examine M.C.' s
friend "as to her recollection of all events" and M.C.' s "state of mind." Id.
But according to Long, the prosecutor told him before the preliminary
hearing that M.C. did not want Defendant to go to prison. Id. Based on this
information, the defense waived preliminary hearing.

R246-48.

Long,

however, continued to prepare for trial. R248.
Among other things, Long hired an investigator. Id. The investigator
spoke with M.C., who allegedly told him that she understood Defendant
had already pleaded guilty. R248-49. The investigator also told Long that
M.C. "expressed no anger or vindictiveness against Defendant in her
conversation but did not mention, one way or the other what punishment
he should receive." R249. The defense team also 1noved to suppress the
evidence against Defendant. Id.

But before the trial court ruled on the

motion to suppress, the parties reached a plea agreement. R250-51.

As

noted, in exchange for Defendant's guilty plea to a second degree felony,
the prosecutor agreed to "recommend no prison sentence be served by

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Defendant provided that" M.C. "did not affirmatively insist upon the
prosecution seeking a prison commihnent." Id.
According to Long, the defense did not know that M.C. wanted
Defendant to do prison time until they received the AP&P report. R252.
Upon receiving the report, Long asked the defense investigator to again
contact M.C. "to determine whether she had just changed her mind or
whether she always wished to have a prison sentence served by the
defendant." R253. The investigator reported that M.C. told him "that she
always wanted a prison sentence for the defendant and had told the
prosecuting attorney her desire from the very beginning." Id.
The investigator's affidavit reiterated information in Long's affidavit,
and included a defense-prepared transcript of his telephone conversation
with M.C., where she denied telling the prosecutor that she did not want
Defendant to go to prison. R256-58,263 (Addendum C). According to the
h·anscript, M.C. told the prosecutor that the most important thing to her was
that Defendant be required to register as a sex offender: "I didn't say that I
did not want him to go prison, I said, 'Well, it's more important to 1ne that
he's on the sexual offender's list.' That was like-I said that I wanted him to
serve prison time, but the most important thing to me was that I wanted
him to go on the sexual offenders list." R263-64.

-7-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendant's affidavit stated his understanding that, in exchange for
his guilty plea to a reduced charge, the prosecutor "would recommend that
[Defendant] not go to prison unless [M.C.] insisted that [he] go to prison."
R271 (Addendum C).

Based on the affidavits, the defense argued that the prosecutor had
allegedly intentionally misled Defendant about M.C.'s position on his
serving prison time. This, Defendant argued, (1) constituted prosecutorial
misconduct in violation of Defendant's right to due process, see R311-14;
and (2) rendered Defendant's guilty plea unknowing and involuntary under
the plea withdrawal statute, Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (West Supp. 2015-16),

see R314-17. Alternatively, Defendant offered to withdraw his motions if the
court would sentence him to probation with or without jail time. R317-19.
Represented by a new prosecutor, the State opposed Defendant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. R329-33 (Addendu1n D). The State
argued that Defendant's signed Statement and the change-of-plea hearing
transcript showed that Defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary, and
that it had not been induced by any alleged 1nisrepresentation of M.C.'s
wishes. See R329-333. Both the Statement and the hearing transcript made
clear that the prosecutor was uncertain what M.C.'s wishes would
ultimately be, that the prosecutor's recormnendation of no prison was thus

-8-
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contingent on M.C.' s wishes at sentencing, and that Defendant and his
counsel understood that. See R332 (citing both R150 and R364:4,10).
Following argument, the trial court denied the defense motions in a
three-page "Ruling and Order."

R339-341 (Addendum F); see also R366

(Addendum E). The trial court found that Defendant voluntarily pleaded
guilty to forcible sexual abuse.

R339.

In support, the trial court cited

Defendant's signed Statement, which confirmed "that his plea was
voluntary." Id. The trial court found that defense counsel also signed the
Statement, thereby "confirming that the Defendant had read or was read
and understood [its] contents," and "that the confirmations by the
Defendant in the Statement were h·ue." Id. The trial court also quoted the
paragraph in the Statement that explained the plea agreement:
All the promises, duties and provisions of the plea agreement,
if any, are fully contained in this state1nent, including those
explained below: In exchange for the Defendant's plea of
guilty the prosecution agrees that in the event the victim does not

affirmatively insist upon the prosecutor seeking a prison commitment
that the prosecutor will recommend probation and no prison.
R339 (quoting R150) (emphasis added).
The trial court also found that the prosecutor had earlier "represented
to Defendant that, as of the thne of the initial intake, [M.C.'s] impression
was that she would not seek prison time." R340. But the trial court further
found that the prosecutor told the defense at the plea hearing that he had

-9-
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"not communicated" with M.C. since intake, and that his recommendation
was '" simply that we would honor the victim's wishes."' Id. The trial court
found that M.C. made her wishes known at the initial sentencing hearing,
where she asked the judge to sentence Defendant to prison. Id.
Based on the above, the trial court expressly rejected that the
prosecutor had "made a material misrepresentation"

that induced

Defendant to plead guilty. Id. The trial court instead found that the record
supported only that the prosecutor had represented that, when he spoke
with M.C. during intake, "she was not seeking prison time," and that there
was "no evidence that these representations were conh·ary to what the
prosecutor knew to be true." Id. The trial court thus disagreed that the
prosecutor's statement amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, or that the
prosecutor made any intentional, or material misrepresentation of M.C.' s
wishes in order to induce Defendant to plead guilty. Id.
For essentially the same reasons, the trial court rejected Defendant's
argument that his guilty plea was rendered unknowing and involuntary by
the alleged 1nisrepresentation.

Id.

The trial court again found that the

prosecutor made no statements or "misrepresentations, unfulfilled, or
unfulfillable promises."

Id. Rather, the prosecutor explained that M.C.

"initially did not appear to want the Defendant to go to prison," but that his
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recommendation was "contingent on whatever [M.C.]

wanted"

at

sentencing. R340-41. The trial court also emphasized that defense counsel
had "represented" at the plea hearing that Defendant "knew" that the trial
court "was not bound by the recommendation of the prosecution." R341.
As further support for its finding of a knowing and voluntary guilty plea,
the trial court found that Defendant had alleged no violation of rule 11 in
the taking of his guilty plea. Id.
Defendant moved to clarify the trial court's written ruling. R348-350
(Addendum G). Defendant argued that there was no support for the trial
court's "apparent factual determinations" - that the State had made no
intentional or material misrepresentation about M.C.' s wishes-where the
State presented no "affidavit, transcript, recording, or other evidence as to
any prior statements" M.C. "made to the police." R349.

The trial court

denied the motion. See R367:4 (Addendum H).
The trial court then imposed the statutory prison term: "[T]his is
unacceptable conduct, and the victim in this case has suffered and will
continue to suffer a great deal. So, sir, you are before me on a seconddegree felony, and for that you will be sentenced to the Utah State Prison
for 1 to 15 years." R367:12; see also R356-57 (Addendum H). Defendant filed
a timely notice of appeal. R358-59.

-11-
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant seeks reversal of the denial of his motion to withdraw a
guilty plea. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor intentionally misled him
about M.C.'s wishes on his serving prison time before they reached a plea
agreement, and that he relied on the prosecutor's initial representation that
M.C. did not want him to serve prison time when he accepted the plea.
Defendant argues that the alleged intentional misrepresentation constituted
prosecutorial misconduct in violation of his right to due process and also
rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. Defendant also challenges
the trial court's finding that there was no evidence that the prosecutor
intentionally misled the defense on the ground that the State presented no
contradictory evidence.
All of Defendant's arguments fail. It is undisputed that Defendant
knew and understood before he entered his guilty plea that the prosecutor
no longer knew what M.C.'s sentencing wishes would be and that his
recommendation for no prison was thus contingent on what M.C. would
say at sentencing. It necessarily follows that M.C.' s initial wishes were not
mate~ial to the plea agreement. Defendant, therefore, cannot show that any
1?-1isrepresentation-intentional or not-induced him to enter his plea, let
alone rendered ~is plea unknowing or involuntary.

-12-
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Defendant has not shown clear error in the trial court's finding that the
prosecutor did not intentionally misrepresent M.C.'s wishes.

ARGUMENT

I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA WHERE IT
IS UNCONTROVERTED THAT DEFENDANT KNEW AND
UNDERSTOOD
THAT
THE
PROSECUTOR'S
RECOMMENDATION OF NO PRISON TIME WAS
CONTINGENT ON THE VICTIM'S WISHES AT
SENTENCING

Defendant alleges that the prosecutor fraudulently induced his guilty
plea by intentionally misrepresenting M.C.' s pre-plea sentencing wishes.
Aplt.Br.22-27. He argues that this rendered his plea unknowing and
involuntary. Id. at 27-33. Defendant begins by challenging the trial court's
finding

that

nothing

showed

that

the

prosecutor

misrepresented M.C.' s initial sentencing wishes.

intentionally

Id. at 20-22.

He then

asserts that but for the alleged misrepresentation, he would not have
pleaded guilty. Id. at 25-27. Defendant thus argues that the trial court

-13-
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abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his plea. Id. at
2-3. 2
Whether or not the prosecutor intentionally misrepresented M.C.'s
pre-plea sentencing wishes, Defendant cannot prevail because M.C.'s initial
wishes were not material to the plea agreement.

The prosecutor's

sentencing recommendation was expressly conditioned on M.C.'s wishes at
sentencing, not on anything she had said to the prosecutor before the plea
agreement. The record shows that Defendant knew and understood that
when he pleaded guilty.

Defendant, therefore, cannot show that any

misrepresentation-intentional or not-induced him to enter his plea, let
alone rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. And, in any event, he
has not shown clear error in the trial court's finding that the prosecutor did
not intentionally misrepresent M.C.'s pre-plea wishes.

2

Defendant' s brief has three points. In the first, he challenges the trial
court's- finding that the prosecutor did not intentionally misrepresent the
victim's pre-plea wishes. Aplt.Br.20-22. In the second, he contends that the
prosecutor fraudulently induced his plea, thereby committing prosecutorial
misconduct in violation of due process. Aplt.Br.22-27. In the third, he
argues that the prosecutor's alleged misrepresentation rendered his plea
unknowing and involuntary. Aplt.Br.27-33. Although Defendant couches
his Points II and III in different terminology, they are really the same
argument: that the prosecutor's alleged misrepresentation induced him to
plead guilty and that if he had known M.C.' s true pre-plea wishes, he never
would have accepteq. the plea deal. This brief will therefore answer both
points in a single argu1nentbelow.

-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A. Because the prosecutor's pre-plea representation of the
victim's sentencing wishes were not material, Defendant
cannot show that his plea was fraudulently induced or
unknowing and involuntary.

A defendant may not withdraw his guilty plea unless it was
unknowing and involuntary.

Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6; see also State v.

Alexander, 2012 UT 27, iJ29, 279 P.3d 371 (plea withdrawal statute "requires
that, to withdraw a guilty plea, defendant must show that their pleas were
'not knowingly and voluntarily made'") (quoting section 77-13-6(2)(a)). "A
plea is not knowing and voluntary when the defendant 'does not
understand the nature of the constihltional protections that he is waiving, or
because he has such an incomplete understanding of the charges that his
plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt."' Alexander, 2012 UT
27, iJ29 (quoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645n.13 (1976)).
Defendant essentially argues that the prosecutor's alleged intentional
misrepresentation fraudulently induced his plea and that this rendered his
plea unknowing and involuntary.
While not controlling, contract principles may be useful in assessing
whether a guilty plea was knowingly made. See State v. Gladney, 951 P.2d
247, 248 (Utah App. 1998) ("'Contract analysis has some application to plea
agreements."). To making a fraudulent inducement claim under contract
principles, Defendant must show two things: show: (1) that he relied on the
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prosecutor's pre-plea representation that M.C. did not want him to go to
prison; and (2) that his reliance on the pre-plea representation was
reasonable. See Otsuka Electronics (USA, Inc.) v. Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937
P.2d 1274, 1278-79 (Utah App. 1997) (rejecting claim of fraudulent
inducement where appellants did not reasonably rely on Otsuka's
misrepresentations); Despain v. Despain, 855 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah App. 1993)
(rejecting claim of fraudulent inducement absent proof of reasonable
reliance).
Because the record here shows that M.C.'s initial sentencing wishes
were not material to the plea agreement, Defendant cannot show that he
relied on the prosecutor's representation about them- let alone reasonably
so-in pleading guilty.

First, Defendant always knew that the plea

agreement had nothing to do with the victim's initially-expressed
sentencing views, but everything to do with what she would express at
sentencing. At the plea hearing, the prosecutor expressly stated that his
recommendation for no prison was wholly contingent on M.C.'s future
wishes at sentencing because he had not talked to her since the initial intake
and he was uncertain what her wishes would be by that time. See R364:3,8.
Indeed, the condition itself made it clear that the prosecutor was unsure
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what M.C.'s sentencing position was and that he was making no promises
about what it would be by the time of sentencing. Id.
The conditional nature of the prosecutor's recommendation was also
clearly set out in the Defendant's Statement-signed by both Defendant and
his counsel. See RlS0,152. Added to that, the trial court confirmed that
Defendant understood that the prosecutor's recommendation was not
binding on the court.

R364:8-9.

Finally, both Long's and Defendant's

affidavits in support of the motion to withdraw the plea reiterated their
understanding that the prosecutor's recommendation was contingent on
M.C.'s wishes at sentencing. See R250-51;R271.
Thus,

Defendant

unquestionably

knew

that

any

sentencing

recommendation was conditioned only on what the victim would say at
sentencing and not on anything she might have said to the prosecutor
earlier. Defendant also knew that regardless of what M.C.' s wishes were at
the initial intake, the prosecutor was unsure if she would retain those
wishes at sentencing.

By agreeing to the conditional recommendation,

Defendant assumed the risk that M.C.'s wishes could differ from what the
prosecutor initially said they were. Thus, Defendant could not have relied
on the prosecutor's representation of M.C.'s initial wishes in deciding to
plead guilty.

-17-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

But even if Defendant had relied on the prosecutor's representation,
any reliance was umeasonable. See Otsuka, 937 P.2d at 1279 (rejecting claim
of reasonable reliance where appellants' "obviously knew Otsuka could not
timely deliver an Otsuka MRI machine" before signing "amended lease
agreement"); Despain, 855 P.2d at 257 (rejecting ex-wife's claim that she
reasonably relied on ex-husband's representations before signing quit claim
deed where evidence supported trial court's finding that her reliance was
umeasonable). On this record, the most that Defendant could hope for was
that the prosecutor's impression of M.C.'s wishes when he spoke with her at
intake would re1nain consistent with her wishes when she appeared at the
sentencing hearing. 3

3

To the extent that Defendant cites Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963) and progeny to support his prosecutorial misconduct allegation, his
reliance is unavailing. Brady recognizes a due process violation when the
prosecution suppresses favorable material evidence to induce a plea. See,
e.g., United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2nd Cir. 1998) ("The
defendant is entitled to make [the decision to plead guilty] with full
awareness of favorable material evidence known to the government."). But
Defendant does not claim that the prosecutor withheld exculpatory
evidence to induce his plea. See Aplt.Br.20-33. He claims at most that the
prosecutor intentionally misrepresented the victim's pre-plea sentencing
wishes. But, as stated, those earlier wishes were not a term of the plea
agreement-only her unknown future wishes at sentencing were. Thus,
Brady is inapposite.
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Finally, even if Defendant could show that his reliance on the
prosecutor's representation was reasonable, he ca1mot show that it rendered
the plea unknowing and involuntary because, again, M.C.'s pre-plea
sentencing wishes were not a term of the plea agreement, let alone a
material term. As explained, the prosecutor expressly conditioned any
sentencing recommendation on M.C.' s wishes at sentencing.

The

prosecutor made it clear that he did not know what those wishes would be,
which is why he made his recommendation conditional. And, as explained,
Defendant understood the condition.
Defendant's reliance on State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), is
unavailing for the same reason. In Copeland, the record was unclear as to
"what recomn1endation the State promised to make." Id. at 1274. The Utah
Supreme Court thus vacated Copeland's sentence and remanded to the trial
court to "determine the exact recornmenda tion promised by the State,
defendant's understanding of that promise, and whether the State fulfilled
its promise." Id. at 1276. But here- as the trial court found- there is no
ambiguity about the conditional nature of the prosecutor's sentencing
recommendation, Defendant's knowledge and understanding of it, and the
prosecutor's fulfillment of his promise. See R340-41 (finding "prosecution's
reco1nmendation remained consistently contingent on whatever the victim

-19-
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wanted," "Defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea," and
defense counsel "represented to the Court that his client knew the Court
was not bound by the recommendation").
In short, because the plea was not conditioned on M.C.' s initial
sentencing wishes as represented by the prosecutor, any misrepresentation
as to those wishes could not be material to the plea agreement. Defendant
therefore has not shown that any n1isrepresentation-intentional or noteither induced him to enter his plea or otherwise rendered his plea
unknowing or involuntary.
B.

Defendant shows no clear error in the lTial court's findings
that any misrepresentation of the victim's initial sentencing
wishes was unintentional.

Defendant's arguments also fail because he hasn't shown that the
prosecutor intentionally misrepresented M.C.' s initial sentencing wishes.
Indeed, the trial court specifically found that the prosecutor did not
intentionally misrepresent "the nature" of M.C.'s "wishes" before the plea
hearing:
Rather, the prosecutor represented that, at the time he spoke
with [M.C.], she was not seeking prison time. There is no
evidence that these representations were contrary to what the
prosecutor knew to be true.
R340.
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Defendant challenges these findings because-according to himuncontroverted defense evidence shows that M.C. "always desired a prison
incarceration for" Defendant.

Aplt.Br.21.

Defendant asks this Court to

remand for additional findings or for an evidentiary hearing to resolve the
alleged conflict.

Aplt. Br.22.

Remand is not warranted because - as

explained- the prosecutor's alleged misrepresentation was not material to
the parties' plea agreement. It is also not warranted because Defendant has
not shown any clear error in the trial court's findings.
Again, the prosecutor's recommendation was expressly contingent
only on what M.C.'s wishes would be at sentencing and Defendant
understood as much. See R364:3,8; R150;R250-51; R271. The condition itself
signaled to the defense that the prosecutor did not in fact purport to know
the victim's wishes and that those wishes could very well end up being
prison time. If the prosecutor had truly intended to mislead the defense
about M.C.' s wishes to induce a guilty plea, it made no sense for him to
condition his recommendation for no prison time on M.C.'s then unknown
wishes at sentencing. See id.
And while Defendant proffered a transcript of a telephone exchange .
between a defense investigator and M.C. suggesting that M.C. told the
prosecutor she wanted Defendant to go to prison, Defendant presented no

-21-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

direct evidence that the prosecutor deliberately misled the defense about
M.C.' s wishes.

At most, M.C.' s statements in the telephone transcript

suggest that the prosecutor merely misunderstood her priorities when he
spoke with her at intake. See R262-265. For example, M.C. denied telling
the prosecutor that she did not want Defendant to go to prison, but she
acknowledged that she told the prosecutor that the most important thing to
her was that Defendant be required to register as a sex offender: "I didn't
say that I did not want him to go prison, I said, 'Well, it's more important to
me that he's on the sexual offenders list.'

That was like-I said that I

wanted him to serve prison time, but the most important thing to me was
that I wanted him to go on the sexual offenders list." R263-64.
Given that M.C.' s biggest concern was that Defendant register as a
sex offender, it is understandable that the prosecutor focused on that
con~ern. See R364:3,8. But, again, the prosecutor's condition alone makes
clear that the prosecutor was making no representations as to what M.C.'s
wishes would be at sentencing. The transcript thus fails to establish clear
error in the trial court's finding that the prosecutor did not intentionally
mislead the defense about M.C.'s wishes.

See Steinberg v. Community

Housing Services-Capitol Villa, Ltd., 2014 UT App 102, iflO, 326 P.3d 673
(recognizing "existence of conflicting evidence does not give rise to clear
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error as long as evidence supports the trial court's decision" (quotation and
citation omitted)). Because Defendant has not shown clear error in the trial
court's finding, his claim fails for this reason as well.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on January 26, 2016.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General

Ass stant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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334

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Slectror.ically recorded on January 5, 2015)

3

4

THS COURT: All right, so we're ready, then, on the
State of Utah vs. Robert Magness --

5

MR. ?ARSONS: Yes, ma'am.

6

THE COURT: -- case No. 131903746.

7
8
9

Could I have

appearances, please.
MR. PARSONS: Yes, ma'am.

William Parsons and Larry

Long together with Robert Magness.

10

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

11

MR. MAY: Thaddeus May on behalf of the State.

12

THE COURT: All right, and my understanding was that we

13
14

15
16

17
18

19

were going to have a little bit m~re --

MR. MAY: We were going to take evidence, your Honor,
and we did have witnesses that were prepared to do so.
THE COURT: Okay.

All right, however there's been a

change in plans?
MR. PARSONS: Well, there's been a plea offer made in
the meantime, Judge.

20

THE

21

MR. PARSONS: We have negotiated at length, and we have

22

23
24
25

COURT: Okay.

reached a resolution.
THE COURT: All righc, then. So are you prepared, then,
to proceed on that today?

MR. MAY: We are, your Honor.

The only aspect of the
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1

resolution that's not technically prepared is the State does

2

not have an Amended Information.

3

proceed by interlineation.

4

he's presently charged with rape.

5

We will e-file that.

We can

The proposed resolution is that

which is a first-degree felony.

We will be pleading to a

He will be pleading guilty

6

to a forcible sexual abuse under 76-5-404, which is a second-

7

degree felony.

8

THE COURT: All right.

9

MR. MAY: The State will file within 48 hours that

10

Amended Information.

11

of the elements of the crime.

12
13

The State's happy to make a factual basis

THE COURT: All right, is this done with the alleged
victim's

14

MR. MAY: Correct.

15

THE COURT: Okay.

16

MR. MAY: She's been contacted twice by the State since

17

the offer of this, since we've discussed (inaudible) the case.

18

She's made no response to my attempts to get to her.

19

does not work.

20

very first impression of the case was actually she was not

21

seeking prison at the time and was fairly amenable to resolving

22

the case, and not had any prior (inaudible).

23

has not communicated with the State at all, although we've made

24

multiple attempts to contacc her.

25

Her phone

When we met initially during the intake, her

Since that time

MR. PARSON: I think the factual statement will clarify
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1

that to some degree, your Honor.

2
3

I would represent that --

MR. MAY: H€:r wishes are not being cut out of this
resolution.

4

THE COURT: All right.

5

MR. PARSONS: I would represent that the victim and the

6

perpetrator in this case were so drunk that neither of them

7

knew what was going on or the context.

8
9

10

THE COURT: I apologize, my computer is being extremely
slow.

Thank you.

So was there a preliminary hearing or was

there a waiver?

11

MR. MAY: It was a waiver, your Honor.

12

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

13

14
15
16
17

Then anything else

you wish to put on the record, then?
MR. MAY: We will as a part of this when we state the
actual resolution, I believe.
THE COURT: Okay.

All right, then, so Mr. Magness, you

have a plea form there that you've reviewed with your attorney?

18

MR. MAGNESS: Yes.

19

THE COURT: Do you have any question about those rights

20

that you're giving up by going forward today?

21

MR. MAGNESS: No.

22

THE COURT: If you'd just step forward to make sure

23

that you're on the record, sir.

24

MR.

25

THE COURT: Thank you.

l'-'.1AGNESS:

Thank you.

No.

You understand that you're

-4-
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1

presumed innocent?

2

MR. MAGNESS: Yes.

3

THE COURT: Do you understand that you're entitled to

4

go to trial in front of impartial jurors?

5

MR. MAGNESS: Yes.

6

THE COURT: You understand that it's the State's burden

7

to prove all the elements of the charge against you and that

8

you don't need to prove anything?

9

10

MR. MAGNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: You also understand that you can make

11

witnesses come forward, you can put on evidence, and you can

12

testify yourself in your defense?

13

MR. MAGNESS: Yes.

14

THE COURT: All right, so you're giving up those rights

15

among others by going forward today?

16

MR. MAGNESS: Yes.

17

THE

COURT: All right, and you understand that what's

18

been represented is that you be pleading guilty to a second-

19

degree felony?

20

MR. MAGNESS: Yes.

21

THE COURT: You understand that a second-degree felony

22

~ould result in 1 to 15 years at the Utah State Prison, in

23

addition to fines and surcharges?

24

MR. MAGNESS: Yes.

25

THE COURT: Is restitution an issue as well?
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1

MR. MAY: Your Honor, I don't know that there would be

2

a large amount, if it's an issue.

3

counseling costs, but I don't know for a fact.

4

out there.

I think that there could be
That is just

5

THE COURT: All right, but you under --

6

MR. MAY: It is not part of this resolution.

7

THE COURT: Okay.

8

MR. PARSONS: There is nothing in the record that would

9

indicate at this particular point.

10

MR. MAY: Right.

11

THE COURT: All right, but you understand, sir, that if

12

there is a claim for restitution, that that would be something

13

that you would be responsible for as well?

14

MR. MAGNESS: Yes.

15

THE

16

MR. MAGNESS: Uh-huh.

17

THE COURT: You have to answer with a "yes" or a "no,"

18

COURT: All right, are you thinking clearly today?

sir.

19

MR. MAGNESS: Yes.

20

THE COURT: Are you under the influence of anything

21

that might impair your ability to make a good decision?

22

MR.

23

THE COURT: Do you understand that when you enter a

MP..GNSSS:

No.

24

plea like chis it really limits your ability to make any sort

25

of appeal?

-6-
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1

MR. MAGNESS:

2

MR. ?ARSONS: Answer affirmacively.

3

MR. MAGNESS: Yes.

4

THE COURT: All right, do you have any questions before

5

(No verbal response).

we proceed?

6

MR. MAGNESS: No.

7

THE COURT: All right, could I have a factual basis,

8

please.

9

MR. MAY: Yes, your Honor, on April 12t~, 2012 in Salt

10

Lake County the defendant did touch the breast, genitals area

11

of the victim, MC, and did so without her consent.

12

so with intent to gratify his sexual desire.

13

establishes the elements.

14

years 0f age.

15
16

He also did

I believe that

At the time the victim was over 14

MR. PARSONS: That is what we have so indicated in the
plea agreement.

17

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

18

heard the description of what occurred.

19

description as to what occurred?

Mr. Magness, you
It is that an accurate

20

MR. MAGNESS: Yes.

21

THE COURT: All right, then, sir, to the charge of

22

forcible sexual abuse as a second-degree felony, how do you

23

plead?

24

MR. MAGNESS: Guilty.

25

THE COURT: Court finds that you're knowingly and
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1

voluntarily entering into the plea, and you can go ahead and

2

sign that plea form.

3

(Defendant signing document)

4

THE COURT: Thank you.

5

MR. ?ARSONS: Your Honor, may we make a statement on

6

the record relative to the basis for the agreement?

7

THE COURT: Yes.

8

~R. PARSONS: Yes, it is anticipated, your Honor,

9

that in exchange for this guilty plea, that as the prosecution

10

has heretofore indicated to the Court that unless the victim

11

affirmatively requests a commitment of prison for the defend-

12

ant's behavior, that the prosecution in this matter will recom-

13

mend no prison time, and will recommend probation in some form.

14

MR. MAY: That is correct, your Honor.

15

ation is simply that we would honor the victim's wishes.

16

the victim were asking for a prison sentence, we're not bound

17

to not recommend prison.

18

sentence, we will not go beyond her request.

19

ation, however, does not bind the State in any way as to jail,

20

that it would be see~ing in event, regardless of (inaudible).

Our recommendIf

If the victim is not seeking a prison
That recommend-

21

THE COURT: Thank you.

22

MR. PARSONS: We recognize the same.

23

THE COURT: You also recognize that the Court's not

24
25

Thank you.

bound by any such recommendation as well?
MR. PARSONS: That is correct, and so -- we have so

-8-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

explained to our client.

2
3

THE COURT: All right, and so do you anticipate, then
a pre-sentence report?

4

MR. PARSONS: Yes.

5

THE COURT: All right, and does your client, then,

6

waive the maximu~ time for sentencing?

7

MR. PARSONS: Yes.

8

THE COURT: All right, so we'll have AP&P do a pre-

9

10

sentence report.

Remind me, then, as Mr. Magness is out on

do we --

11

MR. PARSONS: He's out of jail.

12

THE COURT: Okay, he's out on bond, right?

13

MR. PARSONS: Yes.

14

THE COURT: Okay. All right, so, Mr. Magness, so you're

15

waiving the maximum time, because the next sentencing date we

16

have -- would you anticipate a special set or you don't

17

MR. MAY: No, your Honor,

18

MR. PARSONS: I don't believe so, Judge.

19

THE COURT: All right, so March 2~ at 9 a.m.?

20

MR. PARSONS: May we just check, Judge, please?

21

THE COURT: Certainly.

22

MR. PARSONS: Judge,

23

24
25

I don't believe so.

that should work just fine.

Thank

you.
THE COURT: Okay, so March 2~ at 9 a.m., but in the
meantime, sir, you'll need to get down to AP&? to get a pre-
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1

sentence report.

2

Basically you down and you pick up your packet and you make

3

an appointment for a followup.

4

probably not today, but if not today, tomorrow, to pick up

5

your packet to begin that process, all right?

6

referral form to take that with you, and that tells you where

7

to go.

So you'll -- and it's a two-step process.

So you'll need to get to AP&P

So that's your

8

MR. MAGNESS: Okay.

9

THE COURT: All right, any questions about what we

10

expect from you in the meantime?

11

MR.

12

THS COURT: All right, so you make sure you take care

MP..GNESS: No.

13

of thac with AP&P, and then we'll see everyone here on March 2~

14

at 9 a.m.

15

MR. PARSONS: Thank you very much, your Honor.

16

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

17

MR. MAY: Thank you.

18

MR. PARSONS: May we be excused, Judge.

19

MR. MAY: Yeah, may we briefly approach, your Honor.

20

THE COURT: Certainly.

21

(Discussion at the bench off the record)

22

THE COURT: Okay, fine.

23

MR. PARSONS: Thank you, Judge.

24

THE COURT: All right, we will see you, then, in March.

25

(Eearing concluded)

Thank you.
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ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH
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transcript, as an independent contractor working·under her
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under Utah statutes.
That this transcript is full, true, correct, and contains
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thereof.
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· - - · 9 crnderstand that by preading guilty I wiH be admrtting that I committed the crime$
listed above_ (Or, if I am pleading no contest I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or. if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute
or contest)"that the foHowing facts descnoe my conduct and the conduct of other

-=-

persons for which l am criminally liable.. These facts provide a basis for the court to
accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I
am pleading guilty (or no contest):
•·
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12.dL }.,J
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Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. f lJnderstand that I have the following
rights under the consfif:ufions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if
J plead g~ilty ( or no contest) I will give up all the following righfs: ·
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if
I cannot afford one, an attorney wiII be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I
understand that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay
for the appointed lawyer'$ servi~ to me.

I {have not) ~waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to
counsel 1 I have done so knowingly, intelITgently, and voruntarily for the fa Hawing

reasons=~------------------------Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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If l have waived my lights to counsel, I certify that r have read this statement and ·
· that l understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which lam
pleading guilty (or no ~nfest). l also understand my rights in this case and other cases
and the consequences of my guilty (or no contest) pfea(s).

If I have not waived my li~ht to counsel, my attorney is L • LO ...J "j 4-,J i'J Wi'."'\ , ~:, 0 <:fi
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statemen~ my rights, and the consequences
of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s)..
Jury Trial: f know that I have a right to a speedy and public 1rial by an impartial

(unbiased) jury and that I y.,ill be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses: I know that if I were to
a) I wourd have the right to see and observe the witnesses who tesfified

have a trial1

. --. .ags-Jns.tJll.~ ~!Jg-:. t>l.11J.Lc!!"tQf!.l~Y1 p~mY.self_if.I._Y!r:~<=:<111:J._ri.g.Jlt to c:!!:!_?~p_meyl w~uld
have the opportunax to cross-exam me aU of the wimesses who tesfified against me.

•

. . ..

Right to compel witnesses: f know that if f were to have a trial, J could call
witnesses if f chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the
attendance and testimony of those witnesses. If r could not afford to pay for the ~
witn~ses to appe~, the State wouJd pay thos·e costs.
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination: I know that ff [ were
to have· a trial, J would have the right to testify on my own behalf_ l also know that if I

chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against
myself. I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could
not hold my refusal to testify against me~
·
.
Presumpf;ion of innocence and burden of proof: I know that if I do not plead
guilty (or no contest) 1 I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of
the charged crime(s). If f. choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead Rnot
guilty, and my case will be set fur a iriaL At a biaJ. the State would have the burden of
proving each element C?f the charges(s) beyond a reasonable doubt If th£? trial is before
a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror woufd have to find me
R

guilty.

I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption· of
innocence and will be admitting ihat I commrf:fed the crime{s) stated above.
Appeal: I know that under the Utah Constitution, if 1were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford
the costs of an appeal, the state would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am
giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I pfead guilty (or no contest). I understand
that if I wish to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal wtthin 30 days after
my sentern;;e is entered.
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I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up
all the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.. ·

Consequences of Enfering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea

Potential penalties: I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for
each crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). 1know that by pleading guilty
(or no contest) to a crime that canies a mand~ory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to
ser.ving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison
· . term, fine, or both....
.
I know that in addition to a fine, an ninety percent (90%} surcharge wiJI be
imposed_ I also know that I may be ordered to make resfif:ution to anyvictim(s) of my
crimes, including any restif:ufion that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as
part of a_ pJt?.a .?!Qr~~nt
Consecutive/concurrent prison tenns: I know that ifihere is more than one
crime involved. the sentenpes may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or
they may run at the same fime (concurrently). I know that I may be.charged an
additional fine_ for each crime that I plead to. l also know that if I am on probation
pa·ro[e, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or
which I have plead guilty (or no contesf) 1 my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may
result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now
pfeading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the Jaw requires
the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court 'finds and states on the
record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.

or

Plea agreement My guilty {or no contest) p[ea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result
of a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. Alf the promisesl
duties and provisions of the plea agreement if any, are fully contained in this
statement, incfuding those explained below:
·
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Trial judge not bound: l know that a·ny charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the
charges for sentenclng, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting
attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me
as to what they believe fue judge may do are not bfnding on 1he judge.
·
rmmigrafion/Deporf:ation: I understand that if I am not a United States citizen,
my plea(s) today may. or even will, subject me to deportation under United States
immigration laws and regulations, or otherwise adversely affect my immigration stafus
which may include permanentJy baning my re-entry into the United States_ I
understand that ff I have questions about the effect of my plea on my immigration
status, l shoufd consult with an immigration attorney
., .

1

.

.

.

Defendant's Certification ofVoiuntariness

~-

- ...

-

I am entering this plea of my own free wiII and choice. No force. threats or
unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest)_
No promises except those contained in this statement have been made to me..
I have read this statemen~ or l have had It read to me by my attorney, and i
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am
free to change or delete anything contained in this statement but I do not wish to make
any changes because all of the statements are correct
I am satisfied with-advice and assjsfance of my attorney.
/~

.

I am J .) years of age. I have attended school through the / '2.. grade. I can
rea:d and understand the English language. lf I do not undersiand English, an
interpreter has been provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs,
medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead
guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants
which impair my judgment
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable
of understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of
any mental disease, defect. 9r impairment that would prevent me from understanding
what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s}, I
must file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced..

I understand that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea
agreement must be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest I will
only be allowed to withdraw my pfec:J if I show that it was not Imowingiy and ····
volunf:i:!rily made.. I undersfand that any challenge to my plea{s) made after
sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in litre 78,
Chapter 35a,. and Rule 65C of :the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure_
Dated this

.S:

,:-

day of_.:f:_A,;J..=-..,_ _ _ _• 20

IS:

oit'o"fks~[foRE ~

...

Certificate of Defense Attorney

b

f9...,

I certify that ( am the attorney for f?o
MA:=} tvt;; Sf"
• the
defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it
to him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understarfds
the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent To the best of
my knowledge and belief. after an appropriate investigation. the elements of the
crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly
stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the
defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true.

ATTORNEYFQRDEFENDANT
Bar No .. "2-S-3 '>-

Cerfificafe of Prosecuting Attorney
[ certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
(<I> h ~ V'-t, .-.J ~ f , defendant. [ have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and
find that the factual oasis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the
offense(s) is true and correct No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to
encourage a plea has been offered to defendant The plea negotiations are fully
contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on
fue record before fhe Court There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence
would SUP.port the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the p[ea{s) is/are
ente~ and that the acceptance of fhe plea(s) would serve the public interest

~
~
'='"pR::-o=-s:::-=E::=--C"""""'.'.Zl~~:-:-'.-:'~---:-O-RN-~-~~=====-00152
Bar No.
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Order
Based on the facts set forth in tile foregoing Statement and the cerfffications of
the defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court
witnesses the"signatures and finds the de~ndanfs guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are _
freely, knowingly, and vofunfarify made.
IT JS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to
the crime(s} set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.

Dated this

!

day of _

___,a.J_~
_____.
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

- ---- ROBERT- MORGAN-MAGNESSr----Defendant.

MINUTES
CHANGE OF PLEA
NOTICE
Case No: 131903746 FS
--------- --:--- Judge: ----ELIZABETH A HRUBY-MILLS-Date:
January s, 2015

PRESENT
Clerk:
susanp
Prosecutor: MAY, THADDEUS J
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s); LARRY N LONG
WILLIAM B PARSONS III

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: August 2, 1959
Sheriff Office#: 92630
Audio
Tape Count: 3:53-4:02
CR W35
Tape Number:
CHARGES
1. FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE - 2nd Degree Felony

Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/05/2015 Guilty
Defendant waives the reading of the Information.
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
Defendant waives time for sentence.
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered.
The Judge orders Adult Probation and Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence report.
Change of Plea Note
Defendant pled guilty to Count 1 as charged in the Amended Information.
The defendant is advised that this offense may be used as an enhancement to the
penalties for a subsequent offense.
Counsel represent to the Court that a resolution has been reached. The State agrees
that they will not recommend a prison sentence if the victim is not requesting prison.
The State also represents to the Court that the victim is aware of the resolution
and in agreement.
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Case No: 131903746 Date:

Jan OS, 2015

SENTENCING is scheduled.
Date: 03/02/2015
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: THIRD FLOOR - W35
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: _ELIZABETH __A_ HRUBY.-MILL$ _________ _

Date:
B

y

ELIZABETH A HR
'
.

ST .ti"." P ~J.~&OLAtJ

Individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative aids and
services) should call Third District Court-Salt Lake at (801)238-7500 three days prior
to the hearing. For TTY service call Utah Relay at B00-346-4128. The general
information phone number is (801)238-7300.
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Paqe

SIM GILL, Bar No. 6389
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
THADDEUS MAY, Bar No. 11317
Deputy District Attorney
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (385) 468-7600

-·-1N THETHIRD.DISTRICTCOURT~-sALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH

Screened by: THADDEUS MAY
Assigned to: THADDEUS MAY

Plaintiff,
AMENDED
INFORMATION

vs.
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS
DOB: 08/02/1959,
AKA:
4290 W PASKAY DR
WVC, UT 84120
D.L.# 006970261
OTN
SO# 92630
Booking#

DAO# 13007593

Case No. 131903 746

Defendant.

The undersigned Deputy District Attorney upon a written declaration states on
information and belief that the defendant, ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, committed the
crime(s) of:
COUNT 1
FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE, 76-5-404 UCA, Second Degree Felony, as follows: That on or
about April 12, 2012 at 4290 West Paskay Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
defendant did, \Vhere the victim was 14 years of age or older, touch the anus, buttocks, or any
part of the genitals of another, or touch the breasts of a female, or otherwise took indecent
liberties with the actor or another, with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to any
person or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of any person, without the consent
of the other, regardless of the sex of any participant.
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THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
D HAMILTON, J AVERETT, SHANTEL BILLINGS, M.C., A COWAN, MORGAN
MAGNESS, P PLESE, M SILLER,
DECLARATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE:
·--··· --- ·----------·Your Declarantbases~this Information-upon-the-following:---------~-------------·-----------·---------------- - ----- --•
The statement of M.C. that on April 12, 20 I 2, she was asleep at 4290 West Paskay Drive, Salt
Lake County. M.C. states that she went to sleep with her friend in a bed downstairs. M.C. states
that when she woke up her friend's father, defendant ROBERT M. MAGNESS, had his penis
inside her vagina. M.C. states that she jumped up and told the defendant to get away from her.
The statement of West Valley Police Officer D. Hamilton that he an-ived at the above address
and spoke to the defendant. The defendant states that he only touched M.C. on the shoulder.
The statement of Pilar Shortsleeve, a Chief Forensic Scientist with the State of Utah Crime
Laboratory, that she was able to complete a DNA analysis on evidence collected from M.C. 's
Code Rexam. Seminal fluid located on the anal/perianal swabs matched the DNA profile for the
defendant.
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78B-5-705
(2008) I declare under criminal penalty of the State
of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct to the
best of my belief and knowledge.

Executed on: - 1/5/15
-~------Isl Thaddeus Mav

Declarant

Authorized for presentment and filing
SIM GILL, District Attorney
Isl Thaddeus May

Deputy District Attorney
5th day of January, 2015
KRH /DAO# 13007593
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IN THE THIRD JUD:CIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

~

----

ORIGINAL

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

vs.

i Case Ne. 131903746 FS

ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS,

D~fendant.
______________

)
)
)
)
)

JUN - f 2015
l'ALT!.AK~~y

Sentencing Hearing
!J;-_ _ _ _ _~f.-..~Vh--.,..,_J...
Electronically Recorded en
'-C)C•l9'trr;C~
March 2, 2015

BEFORE: THE HONORP.BLE ELI ZABE:TH A.. HRi.J3Y-MILLS
Third Dist=ict Court Judge

.n.?PEARANCSS

Thaddeus J. May
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

Fer :he State:

111 East Broadway, Suite 40C
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (385) 468-7600
For the Defendant:

William B. Parsons III
Lar:ry N. Long
1 Lakeview
Stansbury Park, Utah 84074
Telephone: {801)466-6311

Transcribed by: Wendy Haws, CCT

1771 South Califo=nia Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
'.:'el e p ho r: e : ~ S Ol i 3 77 - 2 9 27

-1FILED
UTAH APPE.L.lATE COU1TS

SEP 1 4 2015

c}O\':)t)l{\T -cA
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on March 2, 2015)

3

(The inaudible portions in this tra~script are due to

4

the inferior quality of recording provided.)

5

THE COURT: Good morning.

6

MR. PARSONS: Good ~orning, Judge.

7

No. 61, Magness,

M-a-g-n-e-s-s.

8

THE COURT: ~hank you.

9

MR. MAY: Thaddeus May on behalf of the State.

10

THE COURT: All right, so this is case No. 131903746.

11

MR. ?ARSONS: Hay I approach, your Honor.

12

THE COIJRT: Certainly.

13

MR. ?ARSONS: Well, I'll just give it to the bailiff,

14
15

16
17
18

dccume~ts for the Cour~.
THE COURT: Thank you.

Are these things that the Seate

has been provided?
MR. PARSONS: Yes, I spoke to Thaddeus this morning,
and he's received elec:ronic copy.

19

MR. MAY: It was e-filed yesterday.

20

MR. PARSONS: Yeah, we only filed them yesterday.

21

We

just go~ the report.

22

T~E COUR!: Oh,

23

MR. PARSONS: Yeah, that's right, Judg~.

24

THE COURT: All right, so it's a motion to continue and

.25

in fact, last night; is that correct?

:hen a defense based sen:encing report,

it looks like?

-2-
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1

MR. PARSONS: That's right.

Motion to continue, your

2

Honor, if I may.

3

by statute to ~hree days-- three business days,

4

the AP&P report three business days prior to today's hearing,

5

we did not.

6

addressing all of the issues contained therein.

7

material issues assoc~ated wi:h the report, AP&P's report that

8

I would need to address.

It is b~sed upon the fact that we're entitled
having received

We haven't had the opportunity of, accordingly,
There are some

I am also asking for an evidentiary hearing for

9

10

sentencing purposes, and we have submitted a Utah sentencing

11

alternatives defense base report which we would very much like

12

co hav~ the Court read before the Co~rt considers sentencing.

13

Accordingly, for those reasons we would ask that we continue

14

this ~atter fer a s~or: term.

15

THE COURT: All right, Mr. May?

16

MR. MAY: I don't know about the delay i~ the reception

17

of the pre-sentence report, your Honor.

18

it shows.

19

State has reviewed

20

not knowing.

21

I'm not certain what

It was filed in the Court's docket.

(Inaudible)

the

can't really a~swer that response,

The other request by the defense the State would

22

object to, we've had plenty of time to prepare for today's

23

proceedings.

24

anything would it prcfit this to be filed on a Sunday, the day

25

before sencencing, provided (inaudible) notice for the

The

is here.

I can't understand what if

or the

-3-
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1

State.

2

We have (inaudible) statement.

This case is already an old one.

If there are errors

3

or alleged factual discrepancies in this report, defense

4

Counsel can clearly state them.

5

~he record at present.

6

sentencing based on the reasonable, reliable and relevant

7

information.

8

Honor co consider.

They can be considered on

The sentencing, Judge, is (inaudible)

That should be the governing standard for your

The AP&P report is not a mandatory document.

9

There

10

~as been no defense -- no defects or deficiencies cited.

11

don'

12

:his process f~rther.

13

L

I

kno,-.: the point of the hearing other than to dr-ag out

MR. PP.R.SONS: Has nothing to do with dragging it cut,

14

your Honor.

15

able to allow the Court to review the sentencing alternatives

16

-chat we have

17

A short term co~tinua~=e for p~rpcses of being

THE COURT: Why did I just get that last night?

18

MR. PARSONS: You just got it last night, Judge, because

19

we only received the -- Wednesday night is when the AP&P report

20

came ~o us.

21
22

We're entitled to (inaudible).

We're entitled.

THE COURT: All right, so this is just in response to
the pre-sentence report?

23

MR. PARSONS: Yes.

24

THE COU~T:

25

MR. PARSONS: Yes, your Honor, and in accordance with

Yes, your Honor.

It's nc•t an independent recommendation?

-4-
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1

that, so is our motioc to continue the sentencing.

2

THE COURT: I'm not sure -- wait, so was

3

MR.

PARS0!-1S:

(Inaudible)

short: term why you just

4

received che motion also, the short term.

5

of time we've had since we received the AP&P report is why you

6

just received the motion as well.

The limited amount

7

THE COURT: I see, thank you.

8

MR. PARSONS: I only received it from the co-Co~nsel.

9

It didn't even come to me.

: never (inaudible).

I'm the one

10

who would have tried the case.

11

na~ure of the charge is sufficiently severe that the defendant

12

is entitled to all of the due process {inaudible}.

13

we're asking.

14

The nature of the -- again, the

Thst's all

MR. MAY: Your Honor, I know the question the State

15

has, and I did not check the docket this morning, but when

16

does the do8ket show that that pre-sentence report was filed?

17

It's not whether -- when Mr. Parsons received the report as a

18

co-Counsel.

19
20

It's whe~ the document has been filed.

THE COURT: We have it ha~i~g been fi:ed on the 25:h of
February.

21

MR. MAY: Which is the

22

correc:, T~esday of last week?

it's Tuesday, is that

23

COURT CLERK: Wednesday.

24

THS COCRT: Wednesday.

25

MR. !?ARSONS: I: i : was (ina'Jdible) ---

-5-
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1

MR. MAY: Wednesday, Th~rsday, Friday.

2

MR. PARSOKS: No, Friday, Saturday.

3

Friday.

4

You do not count the beginning.

Thursday and

You count the day

THE COURT: Okay, I'm going to allow the concinuance so

However, if the

5

I can review that.

6

today, if she wants to come back, that's fine, too; but I'm

7

willing to hear from ttat

8
9

if the

wishes to speak

to avoid any inconvenience to her.

MR. MAY: Your ~oner, I believe she does wish co address

the Court today; is that correct?

10

MC: Yes.

11

MR. MAY: She has made the trouble of coming, too, so--

12

THE COURT: Okay, well, let's go ahead with allowing

13

her to speak at this time.

14
15

MR.

THE CO~RT: ~e can do ~nat.

22

23

How about we have you back

MR. PARSONS: Yes, I would like to be able to present
witnesses.

20
21

Then we should set the date

on -- and you asked for an evidentiary hearing; is that --

18
19

Ne problem.

at this tiIT'.e?

16

17

PARSONS:

THE COURT: All right, so you're asking for a special
setting?
MR. PARSONS: Yes.
THE COURT: How long do you anticipate needing for that?

24

MR. PARSONS: An hour arid a half.

25

!/:R.

1-:AY:

Your Hono:-,

I

,;uess the State has sorr.e

-6-
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1

inquiry as to what this evidentiary hear~ng (inaudible).

2

a novel approach, in che State's mind.

3

why there's the necessity.

4

the pre-sentence report.

5

6

7

?HE COURT: So ~ow

I'm not understandi~g

The~e's no error noted so far in

what witnesses would you antici-

pate cal.ling?
MR. PARSONS: I'm going to call the private investigator

8

that worked in our behalf.

9

prepared the report concerni~g the defendant's behavior.

10
11

It's

I'm going co call Dr. Mahea who

Those

are a minimum, as well as the defendant and perhaps his son.
MR. MAY: I guess, your Honor,

the State .,,ould simply

12

remind the Court none of the above is required, and all of the

13

above included in the defense case (inaudible) report that sits

14

on ycur Honor's d~sk !i~audible).

15
16

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

We can have you back

on :-1arch 16t• at 1: 30.

17

MR. PARSONS: That's grea~, Judge.

18

MR. MAY: Your iicr.or-, the State -- the S'tate' s prosecu-

19

:or is being ~eassigned that date, and I don't want my replace-

20

ment to walk completely blind into this matter.

21

back in two weeks so t~at he can be brought ~p :o speed a~d be

22

prepared (inaudible).

23

and I don't believe I can be here for that.

If we can come

I'm being reassigned to the West Jordan

24

THE COURT: All right, so come back when?

25

MR. MAY: If we could come back a week from then, at

-7-
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1

least, so that Mr. Flater, who's going co be my replacement

2

in the Special 's Unit will be able to be brought up to speed

3

on this !;latter.

4

MR.

5

objection.

6

think.

PARSONS: We' re accc:,mmodating,
The 23~ is fine.

We don't have any

That's what he's asking for,

7

THE COURT: No.

8

MR. MAY: I think that or two -- I said one or two

9

weeks.

10
11

Is that what you're asking for?

Thac's one week, but that's -- either way.
THE COURT: Would it -- two weeks would be the 16 th •
~

That's the date I gave.

12
13

I

MR. !.(AY:

tr.e 16tr,_

So the 16-::i is the

I gotcha.

That would be the

Two weeks from

date that the State

14

THE COURT: Oh, I see.

15

first day of :he change.

16

MR. MAY: Right.

17

THE COURT: I understand.

18

MR. PARSONS: The 30tt is fine, Judge.

19

THE COURT: Well, I was working on my calendar, which

20

had

c1. v a .i. .l ab i

That's what he--

l i t y on the a f t er noon o f the 1 6 u: •

21

MR. ?ARSONS: Sure.

22

COURT CLERK:

23

THE: COURT:

24

MR. ?ARSONS: That also is fine, Judge.

25

MR. MAY: Just so the Statg understands what to expect

We can do it at 3: 30 on th,2: 30 th •

Sc 3: 30 on March 3Qtt,.

-8-
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1

on that date, we anticipate the :aking o! evidence frore defense

2

witnesses in addition ~o the actual sentencing, or is the State

3

going to take -- or is the Court going to take evidence and

4

sentence it at a later dace?

5
6

THE COURT: I anticipate going forward with sentencing
on that dace.

7

MR. ?ARSONS: Yes.

8

THE COURT: All right, then.

9

So -- but we'll hear from

the witness now?

10

MR. MAY: Correct.

11

TEE COURT: All right, thank you.

12

MC: I don't ~now how appropriate this is ~ow, since I
was expecting him to be sen:enced, bu: I'1c just going to --

15
16

THE COURT: You're welcome to come back on that date
as well.

17

18

All right, so

Mr. Magness, if you would step over her~, please.

13

14

Okay.

I just don't want ycu to be inconvenienced.
MC: I just want to say what I have to say and then

lenve.

19

ru~ COURT: Okay.

20

MC: Robert, you have hurt me in such a de~p way, I

21

wonder if you can even comprehend what you have done. I want to

22

know why ycu did this to me.

23

took something precious to me, DY piece of mind, and a piece

24

of my spiri~, and I wa~t i : back.

25

I have done nothing to you.

You

It ~as not yours to take.

Along wi~h your Fenis, you put ~ear, discrust, pain

-9-
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1

and a hollowness inside of me, and I am here to give it -- to

2

retu=n it to you.

3

what makes you thin~ you have the right to do this to somebody,

4

but you do not.

5

ity at some point, and perhaps you should spend the rest o!

6

your life locking inside of the uglin~ss you've created and

7

figuring o~t how to re~ove it so you are not destroying the

8

lives of other people.

I d0~'t know what happe~ed in yo~r life or

It seems you have lost your decency and human-

9

As far as what I believe should be dealt to you, I

10

am asking the Judge to sentence you two-and-a-half years in

11

prison, the same sentence you've dealt me, t~e prison I've been

12

in waiting fer this to be over.

13

sexual offenders list, so there's a possibility a girl might

14

see it and think twice about being in a vulnerable position

15

in your presence, even if it is under the pretense of partying

16

with your 20-something-year-old son.

17
·18

I also want you to be on the

Even though I have not seen you in over two years,
you have still been a presence in my life.

I hope you never do this again; and if so, may karma

19

are not.

20

and the universe have its way with you.

21

THE COURT: Thank you.

22

After this, you

have our new date,

All right, with chat, then, we

and I will see you :hen.

23

MR. MAY: Thank you, Judge.

24

MR. PARSONS: Thank yo~, your Ho~or.

25

(Hearing concluded)

Thank you.
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF UTAH

)

) ss.

I, Wendy Haws, a Notary Public in and for the State of
Utah, do hereby certify:
That this proceeding was transcribed under my direction
from the transmitter records made of th8se proceedings.

That I
transcript,
license as
under Utah

have been a~thorized by Beverly Lowe to prepare said
as an independent contractor work~ng under her
a certified court reporter appropriately authorized
statutes.

That :his transcript is full, true, correct, and contains
all of the evidence and all matters to which the same related
which were audible through said recording.
I further certify that I am not interested in the outcome
th'=reof.
That certai:-l parties were not identified in the record, and
therefore, the name associated wich the statement may not be
the correct name as to the speaker.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 21s: day of May 2015.
My commission expires:
January 12, 2016

tfondy Ha~ CCT

NOTARY ?:.JBLIC
Residing in Utah County

Signed:

Beverly'Lc,we, CCR/CCT
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LARRY LONG (# 1989)
L. LONG LA WYER, INC.
341 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 322-4666
E-mail: llong@l lon!.!lawver.com
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA
AND STAY SENTENCING
PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE No. 131903746
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS,
JUDGE: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant, ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, by and through his
counsel of record, Larry Long, and pursuant to Utah Code§ 77-13-6(2), hereby respectfully
requests leave of the Court to withdraw his plea of guilty to the charge of forcible sexual abuse,
under Utah Code§ 76-5-404, a second degree felony, as entered on January 5, 2015. The
Defendant requests 30 days to prepare and file a Memorandum of Law and Authorities in

1
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support of this Motion. The Defendant needs this time because one of his material witnesses
required to substantiate the facts surrounding the basis for this Motion is out of the country.
The Defendant further requests that this Motion serve as a basis to stay the sentencing
hearing currently scheduled for March 30, 2015, at 3:30 PM.
BASIS FOR MOTION

The Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the charges in this case after lengthy negotiations
under which the Defendant and his legal counsel were assured that the alleged victim would not
ask the Court to sentence the Defendant to prison. This was a critical element of the negotiations
and the basis for why he agreed to the plea bargain. However, after the Defendant entered his
plea of guilty in this case, the alleged victim personally appeared and beseeched this Court to
sentence the Defendant to prison.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-l 3-6(2)(a) provides that "[a] plea of guilty or no contest may be
withdrawn [ifJ ... it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." The Defendant will provide
evidence in his forthcoming Memorandum of Law and Authorities that will show that his plea
was not knowingly or voluntarily made because he was unduly and unlawfully misled into
accepting the plea agreement. Accordingly, the Defendant respectfully asks that sentencing in
this case be stayed until this matter can be fully briefed and the Court has an opportunity to rule
on this Motion. The Defendant anticipates that he can complete and file the Memorandum of
Law and Authorities within 30 days from the date of filing of this Motion.

2
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26 th day ofMarch, 2015.

Isl Larry Long
Larry Long for
L. LONG LA WYER, INC.
Attorney for Defendant

3
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CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713
CRAIG S. COOK, PC
3645 East Cascade Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Phone: (801) 485-8123
E-mail: kiskaa@att.net

Attorney for Defendant

TN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COtJRT
IN A ND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OP UTAH,

Plaintiff,

AMENDED IvlOTION FOR
LEA VE TO WITH.ORA W GUILTY
PLEA, REINSTATE PRELIMINARY
HEARING, AND REINSTATE ALL
PRIOR FILED MOTIONS AND

vs.

REQUESTS
l.'.il

ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS,
Case No. 131903746

Defendant.

Judge: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS

COfvIES NO\V the defendant Robert Morgan Magness by and through his
attorneys Craig S. Cook, Larry Long, and William Parsons III and respectfully
¼lb

request leave of the Court to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of forcible

sexual abuse (Utah Code Section 76-5-404) as entered on January 5, 2015. In
addition'j Defendant requests that this Court reinstate a preliminary hearing to give

Defendant the opportunity Lo cross-examine vvitnesses and to evaluate the evidence
of the prosecution. Finally~ Defendant requests that all prior motions and requests
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made by defense counsel prior to the entry of the guilty plea be reinstated and ruled

upon by this Court.
Defendant bases these requests upon Section 77--13-6(2) U.C.A. and upon
the United States and Utah Constitutions as to due process oflaw and all other

applicable rights of trial by jury.
The legal and factual basis for these requests is contained in the

accompanying Memorandum and Affidavits.

In the alternative, Defendant is willing to withdraw these motions in the
event the Court elects to impose probation with or without jail time.
DATED this 10 th day of April 2015.

S/Craig S. Cook
CRAIG S. COOK
Attorney for Defendant
Notice has been served upon counsel of record in the above-listed case by
electronic notification in accordance with U.S.C.P. S(BIAi).

Isl Craig S. Cook
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CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713
CRAIG S. COOK, PC
3645 East Cascade \Vay
Salt Lake City: Utah 84109
Phone: (801) 485-8123
E-mail: kiskan(matt.net
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

P]aintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW GUILTY
PLEA, REINSTATE PRELIMINARY
HEARING, AND REINSTATE ALL
PRIOR FILED MOTIONS AND
REQUESTS

ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS,
Defendant.

Case No. l 31903 746
Judge: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS

COivfES NOW the defendant Robert Morgan yfagness by and through his attorneys
Craig S. Cook~ I .an-y Long, and William B. Parsons, JI] and submits the following memorandum

in suppoti of the contemporaneously filed motions.
ST ATEl'vfENT OF FACTS

The following Statement of Pacts is based upon the Affidavits of Shawn Kane} Larry
Long, and Robert Morgan tvfagncss that are attached herein. In addition, Defendant bas attached

the transcriptions of a hearing held on January 5, 2015 and March 2~ 2015.
Defendanl was charged with first-degree rape resulting from an incident that occu1Ted at
his residenee on Apri I 12) 2012. The complainant was employed at a local bar and was
acquainted vvith the defendant and his son. She along \;vith defendant's 8011 and nvo other

vi

individuals went tn Defendant's residence in the early morning hours to party. They consumed a

1
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large quantity of hard liquor and other forms of alcohol. It was during her overnight stay at his
residence that the alleged rape occurred.
Defendant retained attomey La11y Long to represent him in this matter. Mr. Long
evaluated the csse and concluded that Defendant had a valid defense concerning the consent of
the complainant and the fact that all parties were totally intoxicated lo a high level even when the

police arrived. Mr. Long planned to use the preliminary hearing to extensively examine the

complainant ancl the other pa11icipants as to all the facts and circumstances of that morning
including their consumption of alcohol and sexual activity.
On June 6, 2013 the matter was set for a preliminary hearing. Prior to the hearing,
however, Mr. Tad May, the Deputy District Attomey, met with the complainant and her

girlfriend. Afterwards~ Mr. May approached Mr. Long and Defendant and expressly told them
that lhe complainant did not want Defendant to go to prison. Mr. May said that perhaps a plea
agreement could be reached in the future.

From Mr. Long's vast experience as a criminal defense attorney, he informed the
defendant that it would now be unwise to conduct a preliminary hearing to cross examine the

complainant ba~ed upon her statement that she did not want Defendant to serve time in the
prison. Mr. I ,ong informed the defendant that should he examine her it would be highly probable
that she ,:vould change her attitude and become hostile against him and would seek prison
incarcei-ation. Upon this advise, Defendant elected to waive his preliminary hearing.
Becau~e no plea bargain had been offered to \-Ir. Long, he immediate]y began to
undertake a defense of the defendant by arranging to have William Brad Parsons III join the
defense term, and by filing various motions and requests. He sought and received an order to
turn over all DNA and clotJJing for independent examination and sought a motion to suppress

2
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some of the stalements made by the defendant to the an·csting officer on the basis that the
defendant had not been properly Mirandized. Additiona1 motions and requests \\'ere made that
\.Vere all opposed by the Distdct Attorney's Office.

Mr. Long also-employed private·investigator Shavv·n Kane to assist him and Mr. Parsons

in preparation for trial. In January of 2014 Mr. Kane telephoned the complainant and
interviewed her as to her version of what had occurred that morning. She told Mr. Kane that she
was surprised that the questions were being asked since it was her understanding that the
defendant had already entered a guilty plea and that she would only have to testify as to his

sentencing hearing. Mr. Kane advised her to speak with the prosecutor to clarify the status of the
case. He did not inquire as to her feelings for Defendant's punishment.
Nearly a year later on January 5, 2015 an evidentiary heating was scheduled as to all of
the pi-ior dcfem:c motions and 1·equests. Mr. Parsons and l'vfr. Long met with Mr. May

immediately prior to the hearing to discuss a potential plea bargain. At that time Mr. May stated
he \vould agree to reduce the charges from a first-degree rape to a second degree forcible sexual

abuse charge. He once again emphasized that the complainant did not want the defendant to go
to prison and that he would even recommend no prison time to the court tmless she affirmatively

insisted for a prison commitment.
Accordingly, the defendant executed a "Statement of Defendant in Suppo1i of Guilty Plea

and Certificate of Counsel". He impliedly \Vithdrew the score of motions that were the subject
matter of the original hearing.
During a dialogue between thjs Court and counsel the following conversation occm1·ed:
THE COURT:

All right, and is this done with the alleged victim's-

MR. MAY:

Correct. She's been contacted twice by the state since lhe offers,
since \.Ve:ve discussed resolving the case, she:s made no response
3
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to my attempts to get response, her phone did not work. \Vhen we
met initially during the intake, her very first impression of the case
was, actua]ly~ she was not seeking prison at the time and was fairly
amenable to resolving the case. And I had (unintelligible) prior.
Since that time~ she has not communicated with the state at all
although we made multiple attempts to contact her.
MR. PARSONS:

And l think the factual statement wHJ. chu-ify that to some degree,
Your Honor, I would represent that-

MR. JvfAY:

Her wishes are not being cut out of this resolution

MR. PARSONS:

1 would represent that the victim and the perpetrator in this case

were so drunk that neither of them knew what was going on in the
context. (pp. 4-5, Tr. of Jan. 5, 2015).

At the end of the proceeding, the following statements were made:
:V!R. PARSONS:

As it is anticipated, Your Honor, that in exchange for this guilty
plea, that is Mr.-the prosecution has heretofore indicated to the
Court that unless the victim affirmatively requests a commitment
of prison for tJ1e defendanfs behavior, that the prosecutor in
prosecution in this matter will recommend no prison time and wil1
recommend probation of some form.

iVfR. \1.A Y:

Thar s correct Your Honor. Our recommendation is simply that
we would honor the victim's wishes. Jf t11e victim were asking for
a prison sentence! we~re not bom1d to not recommend prison and
the victim is not seeking a prison sentence. That's not her request.
That recommendation, however, does not bind the state in any way
as to jail, that would be speaking in any event regardless of the
recommendation. (Id at pp. 10-11 ).

Mr. Long and Mr, Parsons advised the defcndanl lo accept the plea bargain on the basis
that it gave him a highly probable chance of being placed on probation and serving only county
jail time instead of a much longer prison sentence. They informed the defendant that because the
complainant was not hostile and did not seek his prison incarceration that it was highly probable
that the APP would also recommend probation in conjunction with the recommendation of the
District Attorney. They further informed him that the Court would likely take inlo account his

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00309

complete absence of any sexual criminal history of a ~imilar nature and would favorably view
the complainant's request to not send him to prison.

ln preparation for senlencing, the defendant cooperated with APP, which was preparing a
report for this Court. In addition, he participated with a private company called Utah Sentencing
Alternatives in order to give this Corn1 the defense perspective of a sentence recommendation.
In addition, the defendant was regularly attending sex therapy sessions relating to sexual
aggression and was refraining from the use of alcohol or other substances.

/\PP sent its recommendations to this Court and to Mr. Long on Februa1y 25~ 2015. To
Mr. Long's and Mr. Parsons~ complete surprise APP recommended imprisonment. Mos1
surplising, however, was the victim impact statement. The report stated:

MC $laid she has been dealing ,:vith the consequences of this crime now for three
yea.rs and feels it is appropriate the defendant be required to feel and understand the same
coi1sequences in the form of incarceration. She feels it is appropriate for the defendant to
serve at least two years in prison for what he has done so he can also feel the real
consequences of his actions as she has the past three years. MC said she plans to be
pl'esent at sentencing and would like to address the Court if allowed to do so.
The APP repo11 was the first indication to the defense team that the complainant was
seeking a prison term contrary to the representations made hy the Deputy District Attorney.
Accordingly, the defense requested that the sentencing be delayed because the defense team

received the repo1t late and it needed additional time to evaluate what to do in light of this
devastating rccnmrncndation.
On ~vfarch 1: 2015 Mr. Kane easily contacted the complainant at the same number that he
had talked to her previously~ some fifteen months prior. This was in sharp contrast to the claims

of iV1r. May that she was unreachable. She informed him that she always wanted a prison term
for the defendant and also wanted to make

sul'C

tha.l he ,:vould be on a sex offender list. She stated

that 1v'lr. \fay was aware of her desire when she last met with him. She expressed great hostility

5
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toward the defendant contrary to the picture painted by the Deputy District Attorney tlu·oughout
the prosecmion pedod. See telephone transcript attached to Shawn Kane Affidavit.
On Ivfarch 2, 2015, the date originally set for the sentencing, this Court granted a
continuation in order to aflow the defense team to evaluate the APP report. The complainant was
present in the courtroom and asked to speak. A p01tion of her statement was as follows:
As far as what I believe should be done to you, I'm asking the judge to sentence
you two-and-a-half years in prison, the same sentence you've dealt me. A prison I've

been in, waiting for this to be over. 1 also want you to be on the sexual offender list. (p.
12, Tr. March 2, 2015).
Thus, the intent of the defense team and the defendant of entering into t11e plea bargain
was completely overridden by the revelation that the complainant was in fact very hostile and

vindictive against the defendant and sought a prison term for him in complete contradiction to
the reprcsenL1tio11s made by the Deputy Distlict Attorney during the span of the prosecution. The
complainant, instead of being an asset to defendant as antjcipated from the representations of the
Deputy District Atto111ey, was instead, a tl'emendous liability who significantly influenced the
APP recommendation, foreclosed any recommendation by the District Attorney for a probation
recommendation under the plea agreement, and presented herself to the court in a very emotional
and adverse manner.
Bosed upon the material misrepresentation as to the complainant~s prison desires towru·d
defendant, the present :'vfotions are made.

ARGUivlENT

POINT I
THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OF THE DEJlUTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY IN MIS.RE.PRESENTING THE
DESIRES OF THE COMPLAINANT VIOLATED

DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND CAUSE.D
HilVI TO FOREGO HIS RIGHT TO TRIAL nv JURY.
6
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The 1,;tah Supreme Court in Utah v. Hay 859 P.2cl 1 (Utah 1993) enunciated the duty of a
1

prosecutor to provide informalion to the defense. The Court stated:
The prosecution :s responsibility is that of a "minister of justice and not simply
that of an advocate, • which includes a duty "to see that the defendant is accorded
procedural justice and that gui]t is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. n A
criminal ttial is more than a contest between the prosecution and the defense; it is a
search for the truth.
ln Berger v, United States~ 295 U.S. 78 (1935) Justice Sutherland explained prosecutorial

misconduct to niean :(overstepping the bounds of that propriety and faimess which should

characterize tlic conduct of such an officer in the prosecution of a criminal offense."
In the instant case, the Deputy District Attorney Mr. i\fay either intentionally
misrepresented the desires of the complainant as to punishment for the defendant or was grossly

negligent in failing to ascertain her real feelings. This misrepresentation caused the defendant to

waive his right

to

a preliminary hearing because he did not want to alienate what seemed to be a

forgiving complainant. As such, therefore, he gave up his constitutional right to cross-examine

the complainant and to cha1le11ge tht! sufficiency of the evidence in the criminal prosecution.
"The prosecutor has a special duty not to mislead; the government should, of course,
never mnke affirmative statements contrary to what it knows to be the truth." United States v.
Univer.<.ita, 298 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1961 ). The government cannol properly, either explicitly or

implicitly mischaractcrize information that it has. A prosecutor cannot make knowing tL~c of
false evidence by misrepresenting the nature of non-testimonial evidence. 1\Jiller v. Pare, 386
U.S. t ( 1967).

The continued misrepresentation of the desires of the complainant induced Defendant to
later give up his right to a jury tiial and to enter a pica bast:d on the false assurnption that the
complainant would be favorable to him by not seeking a prison term. This po.sitive attitude
7
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would be reflected in the APP report, the recommendation of the prosecutor, and any testimony
before the sentencing court. "When specific guarantees of the Oill of Rights are involved, the
Supreme Court has taken special care to assure that prosecutorial conduct in no way
impermissibly infringes upon them. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974).

It is well settled that the "Brady Doctrine" provides that suppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment. Brady v. 1vfa,y/and, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The

prosecution's violation of Brady can render a dcfendanfs guilty plea involuntruy. United States
v. Wright. 43 F.Jd 491 ~ 496 ( 10111 Cir. 1994). "In the context of an attack on the validity of a

pica, evidence i8 considered material \.\:here there is a reasonable probability but for the failure t.o
produce such in formation the defendant would not have entered the plea but instead would have
insisted on going to trial." U11;1ed Slates v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998). This same

ptinciplc is applicable here.
fn the instant case the prosecutor made several representations lo induce the defendant to
give up his right to a jury trial. First, the chargeable offense \:\'as reduced from a first degree
offense to a second degree offense; second, the prosecutor agreed to recommend no ptison time
provided the complainant did not "affinnatively insist on the prosecution seeking a p1ison
commitmenf'; third, the prosecutor affirmatively stated that the complainant did not desire
Defendnnt to serve a prison sentence and that her wishes \Vere in compliance v,:ith the plea
agreement.

Al3 stated in the filed Affidavits, this plea agreement was most]y attractive because by
reducing the offense from a first to a second degree, it gave the defendanl the opportunity to
eliminate any prison sentence. However: this could only occur if the complainant was

8
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cooperative and did not demand prison incarceration pursuant to the victim rights statutes. The
defense attorneys knew that if this occum:d the defendant would have a high probability of
probation (with county jail time required) because a non-vindictive complainant wou1d
significantly influence the APP report, the recommendation of the prosecutor: and the sentencing

court.
As evidenced by the Affidnvits, jf the prosecutor merely offered to reduce the charge
from a first to a second, the defense team may not have accepted it. \\1hile the range of years is
certainly rnuch greater for a first than a second, the estimated time used by the Board of Pardons
for this pmiicular offense would be approximately the same under either charge. It was only the
inducement of knowing tl1at the complainant did not seek prison time that caused the defendant

to give up his constitutiona1 rights including a trial hy jury.
The prosecutorial misconduct by the prosecutor in misrepresenting and misleading the
defendant deprived him of due process and made his guilty plea invo1untary. Therefore, under
constitutional law Defendant is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea, for a reinstatement of the
preliminary hearing, and a reinstatement of all of the motions and other matters that were

pending prior lo the entry of the guilty plea. Thi~ ruling will allow the defendant to be restored
to his position before the Deputy District Attorney made the misrepresentations and to prepare
for a trial by jury. Utah v. Gent1:1,,, 797 P.2d 456 (1990).

POINT ll

ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO WITHDRA \V
HIS GUILTY PLEA UNDER SECTION 77-13-6(2)(A) U.C.A. SINCE
THR RECORD SHOWS THAT THE PLRA \VAS NOT
KN0,1/INGLY OR VOJ . UNTAJULY MADE.

9
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Section 77-13·6 lJ.C.A. states: ,:A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only
upon leave of the comi and a showing that it ,;,,,1as not knowingly and voluntarily mac.le."
Defendant 111aintains that under the circumstances of this case his guilty plea \\ as not "voluntarf'
1

under controlling case law.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) extensively

dealt wilh the "voluntariness of a plea." The Courl cited a U.S. Supreme Com1 case that stated:
A. plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including

the actual value of any commitments made to them by the court, prosecuto1', or his own

counsel. must stand w1less induced by threat (or promises to discontinue improper
harassment): misrepresentation. including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises, or
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to
the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribe). Brady v. United States, 397, 742 ( l 970).
(Emphasis added).
The Court then cited a Federal 4th Circuit case in \Vhich the defendant was told he could

receive a prison sentence of 90 years--- when in fact the maximum sentence was 55 years.

Defendant pleaded guilty so as to receive no more than a 25~year sentence. The 4th Circuit "held
this misinformation vitiated the voluntariness of the plea because Lhe benefit of the defendant's
bargain had been grossly exaggerated. The defendant was therefore not aware of the true value

of the state's agreement.', Hammondv. United States, 528 F.2d 15 (4 th Cir. 1975), 765 P.2d at
1278.

In Cop<!land, the defendant was promised by the prosecutor to be placed in a sex
offender program at the Utah State Hospital rather than prison incarceration. Based upon that
reptesentation defendant pied guilty. However, the sentencing judge had no power at that time
to commit him

[O

the hospital rather than the prison. The Coutt concluded that the promise was

illusory and permitted the defendant to withdraw his guilt plea.

10
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In State v. Norris, 57 P.3d 238 (Utah App. 2002) the trial court and the prosecutor
promised the defendant that he could pursue a clairn for vindictive prosecution on appeal, but

neither the court nor the prosecutor could fulfill that promise since the trial judge never entered a
final order disposing of the defendant's vindictive prosecution claim and thus it could not be
raised on appeal. The Comt of Appeals held that because the defendanfs "pleas were not made

voluntarily with full knowledge of the consequences of pleading guilty, the defe11dant must be
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea." 57 P.3d at 240.

The initial misrepresentation caused Defendant to waive his right lo a pre1iminary hearing
whjch wa~ critical to his defense if the complainant was hostile and desired blood. Later:- in
exchange for Defendant waiving his right to trial by ju11', the prosecutor agreed Lo reduce the

charge by one degree. The handwritten statcm.cnt under the category "Plea Agreement'~ added
an additional incentive: "ln exchange for the defendanf s plea of guilty the prosecution agrees
that in the event the victim does nol affirmatively insist upon the prosecution seeking a prison
commitment then the prosecution will recommend probation and no prison."
At the time the plea agreement was entered into the prosecutor had misrepresented that
the compla111ant did not want Defendant to serve a prison sentence. It was therefore presumed

by Defendant and his counsel that only in the unlikely event that complainant changed her mind
wot1ld the prosecution not recommend probation and no prison term. In fa.ct, hO\-vever, the

condition was completely meaningless since the complainant at that very moment \Vas insisting
upon prison for the clefondant. The plea agreement~ therefore, was illusionary and while
defendant nnd his counsel believed there was a high probability that the prosecu1or would honor

Lhis promise. in fact. there was next to no probability based upon the complainanfs strong desire

to punish Defendant by prison incarceration at the very moment the document was signed.

11
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In addif ion, the prosecutor's misrepresentation of Lhe complainant's desires not only
affected the recommendations of the prosecutor but would also affected the APP report and

possibly this Court when the complainant spoke so forcefully on March 2, 2015 demanding that
Defendant be sent to prison. These repeated misrepresentations throughout the course of the
prosecution created a false belief that probation was achievable if the defendant agreed to give
up his right to a jury trial nnd plead guilty to the second-degree offense. Once again, this belief
was also illusionary since the ship had already sailed, the bell had already rung, and the email
had already been sent. dooming the probabWty of probation while al the same time eliminating

Defendant's constitutional rights under our jmy trial system.

It is clear that Mr. May either intentionally misrepresented the complainant's position, or

was grossly neg) igent in making the representations because he had no idea what the
complainant actually \vanted. Critically: the defendant had no means of !mowing what the

alleged victim wanted and therefore had to fully rely upon Mr. May's representations in deciding

\Vhether or not lo enter the guilty plea.
Thus~ the critc1ia for Section 77-l3-6(2)(A) have been folly satisfied and Defendant is

entitled to withdraw his guilty plea and to proceed to llial.
POINT III

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS COURT JN ITS DISCRETION
CHOOSES TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT TO PROBATION,
WITH OR 'WITHOUT JAIL TIME, DEFENDAl~T 'WILL \VITHDRA W
HIS 1\:fOTIONS AND ACCEPT THE PLEA BARGAIN AGREEMENT.
Rule 11 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that any recommendation as to
sentencing is not binding upon the corn1. (h)(2). It is well established that a court is not bound
by any recommendations from any source but has complete discretion to sentence a defendant in
accordance with the applicable statute. Slate v. TJwrsron, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1989). See also
12
00317
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992~ 995 (Utah 1978)("aftcr conviction, the penalty to be imposed is an

entirely separate proposition to be detcnnincd by the court as a matter of law.")
Defendant's counsel would urge this Court t.o closely examine the facts and
circumstances of this case as wel1 as the sentencing recommendations from both the APP and the
Utah Sentencing Alternatives. Counsel also would submit tha.t the latter has correctly evaluated
the conduct of the defendant in light of the many factors used Lo determine a fair and proper
sentence.

Here! the defendant has no prior history of sexual assault but docs have a long history of
alcohol and substance pro bl ems. It is undisputed that all of the participants in the pa·rt), at his
house were heavily intoxicated throughout the moming and up until the police officers anived.
The defendant did not seek the companionship of the complainant but ,:vas merely
residing in his home when the group decided t.o come over lo continue their partying. There was
no premeditation on his part to\vard t.he complainant and, if anithing, this could be tem1ed a

crime of spur of the moment opportunity rather than premeditation. There was no violence on
Defendant's pa1t against the complainant. In fact, the only violence was directed at him when

complainant hit him in his glasses.
The defendant has voluntarily submitted himscl f to sex offender treatment with Dr. Juan
Mqjia. He has demonstrated a record of sobriety spanning thirty months and has agreed not to

nse or possess alcohnl or to frequent establi~hments where alcohol is the primary item for sale.
Defense counsel submits that Mr. ivlngness is an appropriate candidate for probation with
or withnu1 nddit.ional county jail time imposed regardless of the recommendations of APP and
the desire of the complaintant.

13
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fn the event this Court chooses to sentence Defendant to probation rather than to a prison
sentence. Defondant will withdraw all present motions attacking the guilty plea and prosecutorial

misconduct and will willingly comply with all requirements imposed by this Com1.
CONCLUSTON
Based upon the preceding arguments and authoiities, Defendant asks this Court to grant
the relief requested.

DJ\ TED this 10th day of April, 2005.

s/Crai g S. Cook
Craig S. Cook
Attorney for Defendant
Notice has been served upon counsel ofrecord in the above-listed case by electronic

notification in accordance with lJ.S.C.P. S(B I Ai).

/s/ Craig S. Cook
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CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713
CRAIG S. COOK, PC
3645 East Cascade Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Phone: (801) 485-8123
E-mail: ki ~k~:i~1(ii''Jit.n '-'1
Attorney for Defend ant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

S'T'ATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT OF
LARRY LONG

Plaintiff,

Case No. 131903746

vs.
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS,

Judge: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Being duly sworn and under penalty of law the declarant hereby declares
and states as follows:

I. I am over 18 years of age and attest to the veracity of the statements
~

made herein.

1
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2. I am a licensed Utah attorney and have been practicing for over 45 years.
I have undertaken the defense of numerous defendants who have been accused of

similar offenses as claimed in the instant case.
3. I was first contacted by defendant Robert Morgan Magness in April of
2013 and asked to enter an appearance to defend him in this prosecution for
violation of Section 76-5-402 U.C.A. first degree felony rape. I entered my
appearance on April 22, 2013.
4. My preliminary investigation revealed that the complainant in this case
together with a friend, the son of Defendant, and another male had been drinking
and partying at a bar in which the complainant worked. After the bar closed, the
four decided to go to Defendant's home to continue to drink and party.
5. Upon arriving at Defendant's residence all of the participants including
Defendant continued to drink and party throughout the early morning hours.
6. During the late morning around 9:00 a.m. the alleged sexual assault
occurred against the complainant. When officers arrived at the residence they
noted that the complainant, her female friend, and the defendant were all
intoxicated in various degrees.
7. Based upon this investigation I determined that Defendant had a
legitimate defense as to whether or not the complainant had consented to sexual

2
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intercourse or whether Defendant believed she had consented in light of both of
their impaired conditions.
8. A preliminary hearing was scheduled for June 6, 20 I 3. It was my
intention at this hearing to thoroughly probe the complainant as to her memory and
to her consumption of alcohol during the evening. I also intended to thoroughly
cross-examine the complainant as to her sexual relations on the morning in
question with Defendant's son prior to his going to work that morning. Finally, I
intended to question the complainant's girlfriend as to her recollection of all events
and the state of mind of the complainant during the timeline that the rape allegedly
occurred.

9. On the date of the preliminary hearing-June 6, 2013, I observed Tad

May, the Deputy District Attorney assigned to this case, consulting with the
complainant and a female companion.
10. Mr. May then left the two females and approached me to discuss the
case. He specifically told me that the complainant informed him that she did not

want the defendant to go to prison.
11. In my experience, this was a significant revelation. I have found that
when the complainant or alleged victim to a sexual assault desires no prison tim.e
for the a1leged perpetrator that a much better result will occur with the defendant
than if the complainant seeks maximum punishment and retribution.

3
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12. From my experience I have found that a complainant who is not
vindictive will greatly assist a defendant in a sentencing proceeding since the
prosecuting attorney and the APP representative will give a much more favorable
recommendation towards reduced punishment or parole. In addition, I have
observed that a complainant who is not vindictive v"ill also influence a sentencing
judge to impose a much less severe sentence.
13. On the other hand, I have observed throughout my career that a
vindictive and determined complainant who seeks maximum punishment towards
an alleged perpetrator will almost always increase the sentence and punishment
that an alleged perpetrator receives upon conviction or upon pleading guilty. This
is especially true with the current victim advocacy law and representation.

14. Upon hearing this revelation that the complainant did not seek a prison
tern1 against Defendant I completely abandoned my desire for a preliminary
hearing. My experience has taught me that if a complainant is favorable to my
client then it is very harmful for me to put that witness on the stand and cross
examine her as to very personal and sensitive issues. Such cross-examination will
almost certainly result in hostility toward the defendant that again will result in
greater punishment.

4
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15. I discussed this new information with my client and advised him that the
preliminary hearing should be waived. He agreed and I informed the court that we
would waive the preliminary hearing in the matter.
16. Mr. May stated that a plea bargain to a reduced charge may be possible
in the future but that he was not prepared to do so at the time.
17. Since no plea agreement had been reached I believed that it was
necessary to prudently continue in the defense of Defendant as to matters that did
not directly affect the complainant and her attitude toward Defendant. I requested
the court, for example, to order discovery of the DNA evidence including clothing
of the alleged victim in order to allow my experts to verify the conclusions of the
State lab. On December 16, 2013 the Court entered an Order granting discovery of

DNA and clothing evidence.
18. In order to continue the defense of my client I employed private
investigator Shawn Kane to assist me in preparation for our defense. On January
10, 2014 Mr. Kane telephoned the complainant and spoke with her concerning her
version of the events which occurred that night. I informed Mr. Kane to be very
gentle with the complainant and to only try to obtain her version of the facts in
case it was necessary to go to trial. Mr. Kane gave me a summary of her state111ent
including her version of the facts relating to consent. He informed me that the
complainant believed that the case had been settled with Defendant taking a guilty

5
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plea based on her conversation with Mr. May during the prior preliminary hearing
date. tvfr. Kane informed me that he told her that she should gel in touch with the
prosecutor to clarify the status of the case since he was not at liberty to discuss it.
Finally, he reported to me that the complainant expressed no anger or
vindictiveness against Defendant in her conversation but did not mention, one way
or the other, what punishment he should receive.
19. Since no plea agreement had been reached or discussed with Mr. May, I
retained Mr. \1/ilUam B. Parsons, III to assist me in any forthcoming trial in the
matter. It was my intention to thoroughly protect the interests of Defendant in case
it was necessary to go to trial but I was hopeful that the matter could be settled in
Iight of the attitude of the complainant.

20. On January 30, 2013 Mr. Parsons moved to suppress statements of the
defendant as well as all evidence gathered in conjunction therewith as fruit of the
poisonous tree. ln addition, Mr. Parsons moved to reinstate the preliminary
hearing in order to be ab]e to examine two witnesses that were discovered by the
private investigator Ivir. Kane, and were not listed on the original discovery
documents supplied by Mr. May.
21. :Mr. Parsons also filed a supplemental discovery requesting copies of the
digital audio recordings of all interviews with witnesses and the supplemental
narrative by Officer Siller.
6
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22. On February 14, 2014 Mr. lviay, on behalf of the State, objected to
Defendant's motion to reinstate the preliminary hearing arguing that the two new
,;vitnesses discovered by the defense did not justify a preliminary hearing
reopenmg.
23. Mr. May also opposed the defendant's motion to suppress Defendant's
statements, Defendant's requests for a bill of particulars, and objected to the

designation of a defense expert witness.
24. During this period ohime it was the intent of myself and Mr. Parsons to
continue to provide a vigorous defense in preparation of a trial should the need
occur. However, based upon the representation of Mr. May as to the attitude of the
complainant we were hopeful that a settlement could be reached.
25. This Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing to rule on the various
matters that were still pending. While originally requesting such a hearing in
March it was continued for various reasons until January 5, 2015.
26. Both Mr. Parsons and myse1 f were fully prepared to argue all the
various matters that were still pending before the Court in order to protect the
constitutional rights of our client in preparation of a trial. However, ]V[r. May
approached us and proposed that a plea agreement be reached in which the first
degree felony \Voulcl be reduced to a second degree felony-forcible sexual abuse,
and that the prosecutor would recommend no prison sentence be served by

7
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Defendant provided that the complainant did not affirmati,·ely insist upon the
prosecution seeking a prison commitment.
27. Mr. l\,fay informed this Comt on the record that the alleged victim had

been contacted by the state since the initial preliminary hearing meeting but that
she had made no response and that her phone did not work. He stated, "When we

met initially during the intake, her very first impression of the case was, actually,
she was not seeking prison at the time and was fairly amenable to resolving the
case." Based upon this representation Mr. Parsons and myself suggested to the
defendant that he accept the plea agreement which he did.
28. At this time I realized that we were giving up all the previous defenses

and discovery requests that had been made during the last year but felt that the plea
bargain was in the best interest of my client especially believing that the
complainant would not seek a prison term against my client thereby resulting in a
favorable recommendation by the prosecutor and APP to this Court at the time of
sentencing. Because probation with jail time was an option to a second degree
offense but not a first degree offense, I felt there would be a good chance for my
client to avoid a lengthy prison sentence under either a first or second.
29. An amended information was filed by J\11r. May on January 5, 2015

reducing the charge to forcible sexual abuse.
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30. Because my client did not have any prior criminal history involving
sexual abuse I wish to supplement any report by APP with a report prepared by
Utah Sentencing Alternatives, a company I have used extensively to evaluate
defendants such as Mr. Magness. I believe that the APP would give a favorable
report of Mr. Magness in light of the complainant' attitude against a prison
sentence and wanted to supplement its findings with that of the Utah Sentencing
Alternatives report. The report of Utah Sentencing Alternatives recommended 3 6
months probation, 270 days in jail, completion of a sex therapy program and
several other requirements.
31. On February 26, 2015 I received a copy of the APP presentence
investigation report and was totally shocked at what I sm:v. The report
recommended a prison sentence. The victim impact statement recited an interview
with the complainant that stated, "She feels it is appropriate for the defendant to
serve at least two years in prison for what he has done so he can also feel the real
consequences of his actions as she has the past three years." Such a statement was
completely contrary to all prior representations of Ivl r. May.
32. On March 1, 2015 Mr. Parsons and I filed a Motion to Continue
Sentencing based on the surprise contained in the APP report together with the
inadequate time to examine it. We also filed the Utah Sentencing Alternatives'

9
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report recommending probation with 270 days in the Salt Lake Counly Jail. This
Court granted a continuance of the sentencing hearing until March 30.
33. Because of this shocking revelation contained in the APP report I
instructed my investigator lVfr. Kane to attempt to contact the complainant to
determine whether she had just changed her mind or whether she always wished to
have a prison sentence served by the defendant. Mr. Kane contacted the
complainant with no difficulty and transcribed her conversation where she stated
that she always wanted a prison sentence for the defendant and had told the
prosecuting attorney her desire from the very beginning.
34. Based upon this information Mr. Parsons and I determined that we had
been seriously mislead by the prosecutor into entering into a guilty plea based upon
his claim that the complainant did not seek a prison term for our client. We believe
that we had been deceived into giving up Mr. Magness' constitutional rights to
confront witnesses during the preliminary hearing as well as to implement the
various requests and motions that we waived at the time the guilty plea was entered
as well as all of the constitutional rights that go with a trial by jury.
3 5. Accordingly, on Iviarch 26, 2015 we filed a Iviotion for Leave to
Withdraw the Guilty Plea and Stay Sentencing Procedure proceedings. This Court

subsequently allowed briefing of this issue and set oral argument for April 27,
2015.
10
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36. In reviewing the facts and circumstances of this case as stated in the
preceding paragraphs of this Afiidavit, there is no doubt in my mind that I would
not have recommended that my client plead guilty even to a lesser offense knowing
that the complainant was hostile and vindictive and would undoubtedly cause him
to receive an unfavorable report by APP and an unfavorable recommendation by
the prosecuting attorney as well as testifying before the Court in the sentencing
hearing. It is my belief that the evidence in this case creates a reasonable
probability of acquittal based upon the incapacitation of the complainant and the
defendant on the morning of the incident and that, in any event, my client's total
time served at the Utah State Prison for this offense, if convicted, will be
approximately the same time under either a first degree or second degree
conviction. I believed that it was the best course of action to seek probation with
jail time based upon what I thought would be a forgiving complainant as described
by Mr. May.

Under penalty of pe1jury under the laws of the State of Utah, I, Larry Long
hereby swear that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
understanding.

11
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this 10th day of April, 2015
in Salt Lake County, Utah.
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CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713
CRAIG S. COOK, PC
3645 East Cascade Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Phone: (801) 485-8123
E~ma.i I: ldskaa@att.net
Attornev for Defendant
,I

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

~

STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVlT OF
SHAWN KANE

Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 131903746

ROBERT MORGAN J\lfAGNESS,

Judge: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF

0/tV !_5

)

ss.
)

Being ditly sworn under penalty of law, the declarant hereby declares and
states the following:
1.

I am over 18 yea.rs of age and can attest to the veracity of the
statements made herein.
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2.

I am the owner of Kane Consulting, Inc. which is a licensed private
investigation service located in West Bountifrll, Utah. I am a
member of the following organizations: ASIS, PACSCO,
UACDL, NCISS, and PIAU. I was chah111an of the DPS PI
hearing and licensure board from 2008 to 2014.

2. I was retained by attorney Lany Long to assist him concernit1g the rape
charges made against his client Robert Morgan Magness.

3. On Friday: January 10, 2014 l contacted the alleged victim by telephone
using the phone number that was contained in the police and court records.
4. I explained that I \Vas an investigator for the defense and requested that
she provide me infonnation as to what occun-ed on the night of the charged critne.
She gave me a detailed description of her version of the events including her

employment at the Good Spirits Bar that led to her meeting of Defendant, a regu]ar
customer, as we] I as his son Shawn. She described how after her shift ended, she
and her girlfriend together with Shawn and another male went to the residence of
Defendant in order to drink and party.
5. She described the events that night and the following mo111ing when
Defendant allegedly sexually assaulted her whi1e she was sleeping in the basen1ent

area. She further described her reaction and her interactio11 with the police on that
morning.
2
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6. She inf011ned me that in her mind the defendant had already entered a
guilty plea based upon her conversations with the prosecutor at the hearing she last
attended. She stated that the prosecutor told her that she would not need to testify
unless she wanted to go to the defendant's sentencing hearing to say something

about hm:v he should be punished.
7. I advised her at several times in the conversation that she should contact
the prosecutor to clarify the status of the case.
8. 1 did not have any further contact with the alleged victim until March 1,

2015. l was asked by attorney Lan·y Long to try to contact her, once again, in
order to clarify the time frame as to whe11 she first Jet it be known that she wanted
the defendant to serve time in prison . .I contacted her on the same phone nu1nber

that I had previously used in my January 2014 call.
9, I recorded the conversation with the alleged victim so that a complete and
accurate record could be made. I have reviewed the transcript dated March 26,
2015 of this telephone call and believe that it accurately reflects the conversation

that 1 had with the alleged victim on l\!Tarch 1, 2015. This transcript is attached to
this affidavit.

3
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Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Utah, I, Shawn Kane
hereby s\venr that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and

understanding.

...-t,q:

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this JD~:. day of April,
2015 in -·r-·~t:~
~ ~ r' S~
Cou_ nty, Utah .
•••1..,..-:....: .....✓.-l----·---

4
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1

IN THE THIRD .TTJDIClAL DJSTIUCT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKJ!: COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF CTAH:

Plaintiff,

CASE ~o. 131903746

TRANSCRIPTION OF MARCH 1sT, 2015
TELEPHONE TNTERVIE\V

vs.
JUDGE: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-t\·11LLS

ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS,

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant and offers this transcription taken from the recording of a
telerhone interview between Shawn Kane. a private investigator, and M. C., the victim in this
case, which t0ok place on .l'vlarch 15\ 2015. This Transcription \-vas prepared by Aaron A.
Crabtree::, lmv clerk. for I ,arry Long.
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A P P E A R AN C E S

1
2

S1-JAWNKANE

PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR WORKING ON BEHALF OF LARRY LONG

3

4

s

M.C.
VICTIM

6

7

8

9
l.O
11

12
13
l.4

15
16
17
18

19
20

21

22
23

24

25
26
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PROCEEDINGS

1

lii

"
vii

-~

~

2

MR. KANE:

3

Melissa: can you hear me OK?

4

M.C.:

s

Yeah, I can hear you.

6

MR. KJ\:-lE:

7

Ok. Thank you for calling me back~ I appreciate it. Again-

8

M.C.:

9

I was-

10

MR.KANE:

11

Oh~ go ahead.

12

M.C.:

13

l just wanted to clarify. So you are working on behalf of Robe1t, right?

14

MR. KANE:

15

Correct. So, l'm a Iicensed private investigator here in the state of Utah. I ,:vork-

16

rv1.

17

Wait, why would l want to talk to you?

18

MR. KANE:

19

Oh, no, unclerstnndable. I work for attorney Larry T,ong. You and I ac.tually spoke two years ago.

20

M. C.:

21

Yes, I'm acrually upset about that because 1 \l\'as a little bit confused a') to like who I was talking

22

\Vtth.

23

MR. KANE:

c.:
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1

Oh, sorry, sorry. I Lry and explain up front: and sometimes people aren:t- don't completely

2

understand, so, ·cause again I have to be transparent, and so you <lon:t have to talk to me. I'm

3

not- you know, l can't force you to talk to me, anything like that. You don't. ha\·e to. J just- the

4

attorney asked me to ask you n question about, you had talked to that adult probation & parole

S

officer.

6

YI. C.:

7

Yes.

8

MR. KANE:

9

Ho1d that thought I forgot her name . .Jennifer.

10

I\·1. C.:

11

Yeah.

12

MR. K.I\NF.:

13

And there was a question: .Jennifer Murray asked you a question, and then the attorney had a

14

question. I say t'the attorney,'' sorry, Larry Long had a question about prison. And so 1 initially,

15

and I'll explain kind oft.he question and then- initially, when this whole thing stalied and you

16

had spoken wit.h the district attorney and the prosecutor - lhat. would be Thad May - at a hearing

17

they believe you said that you did not want Robe1i to go to prison.

18

J\,J. C.:

1.9

No,

20

:V[R. KANE:

21

Ok.

22

ivt. C.:

23

I didn't say that l did not want him to go lo prison. I said, HWcll, it's more important to me that

r didn,t say that.
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1

he:s on the sexual offenders list." That was like- I said that 1 wanted him to serve prison time:

2

but the rnost important thing to me was that [ wanted him to go on the sexual offenders list.

3

MR. KANE:

I.}

Ok. So you- just to ctarify, so J know: you do want him on the sexual offenders list.

5

:M.C.:

6

Yes.

7

MR. KANE:

8

/\nd, at the time, did you want, ·when you talked to him, did you want him to go to prison too?

9

M.C.:

1ifi

i..J

vjg

10

Yes: r felt like be deserved some time in prison.

11

MR. KANE:

12

Ok. Alright. And that- I just wamed to double check, 'cause there was some confusion from the

l3

attcm,eys' side, and not your attorneys but Larry Long and the paperwork that came in, in

14

making sure that he had the con·ect information, that when you talked to the .. talked to Thad

15

~1ay-

l6

M. C.:

17

Yeah.

18

MH. KAKE:

19

Did you say you ,vanted Robert to go to prison? And then, ~•·hen you taJked to Jennifer \tf urphy,

20

did you also t01l her you \Vanted him to go to prison too?

21

.\tl. C.:

22

Yes. l said the- I said essentially the same thing to her.

23

MR.KANE:

I
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1

Ok. Ok, and thars all 1 ,,._1as trying lo clarify. I do appreciate you, you know, at least talking to

2

me and letting me know on that. And so, that- that was just truly it. They wanted clarification on

3

that Just to-

4

sexual offenders registry.

s

M. C.:

6

1'111 planning on going there. tomoITow, and maybe you could help me \;vith a question. Docs it

7

stai1 at 9AM?

8

1v1R. KANE:

9

1 beHeve it does, yes. At the- as far a~ I know it does start at 9AM~ yes.

to

double check and clarify if you wanted him to go to prison and also be on the

10

M. C.:

11

Ok.

12

MR. KANE:

13

Yeah. So. lfyou are planning on attending, J.'d probably get there maybe about 8:30~ 8:45. You

1.4

know, if you are planning on attending. That way, you can, for you.

15

M. C.:

16

Well basically I just wa11t to say what l have to say and then leave. You know.

17

l'vlR. KAN'E:

18

Ok. ;Cause, it might- it might start directly at 9 o,clock, but it'5 planned io. And so.

19

M. C.:

20

Ok.

21

MR. KANE:

7.2

Yeah. Ok, wclI thank yout and l do appreciate you calling me back.

23

IV1. C.:

Page 6 of 8
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1

Ok. No problem.

2

MR.KANE:

3

Buh-bye.

4

M.C.:

5

Bye.

@

6

END OF RECORDING

7

8
9

10
11
@

12

13
14

15
16
17
18

19
@

20

21
22
23
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TRANSCRIBER,S CERTIFICATE

1

2
3

@

STATE OF UTAH

)

4

)

s

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

6

ss.
~

I, Aaron Crabtree, clerk for Larry Long, do hereby Certify:

7
8

9

10

That this transcription is an accurate representation of a telephone
interview which took place between Shawn Kane, a private investigator, and M. C., the victim of

this ca<;e, on M~rch Pt, 2015.

11

12

WITNESS MY HAND this 26th day of March, 2015

13

14

15

·~.CL;RK
Residing in Salt Lake County

16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
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CRAfG S. COOK, Bar No. 713
~

CRAlG S. COOK, PC
3645 East Cascade Way

Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Phone: (801) 485-8123
E-maH: k h=drna<'q),a.tt.net
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COT.JR.I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UrAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS
Case No. 131903746

ROBE.RT MORGAN 1VIAGNESS,

Judge: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS

Defendant.

)
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
STATE OF UTAH

Being duly swom and under penalty of law the declarant hereby declares
and states as follows:
1. I am over 18 years of age and attest to the veracity of the statements
made herein.

1
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2. Jam 55 years old and have lived my entire life in Salt Lake County.

\Vl1i]e I have had many problems with alcohol and substance abuse I have never
been involved in a sexual assault matter.
3. Upon being charged and anested, I researched various defense attorneys

and concluded that Larry Long was experienced in this type of case and had a very
good reputation for representing his clients.
4. At the time 1 retained Jvfr. Long he infonned me that the entire case
would evolve a.round the question of consent and the credibility of the complainant
versus my credibility in light of the extreme intoxication that occun-ed in my house

that morning.
5. On June 6, 2013 I accompanied l\tfr. Long to the Sa.It Lake County
Courthouse to observe the prelinunary hearing scheduled in my case. Mr. Long
1nformed me that it would be necessary to thoroughly cross examine the

complainant and her girlfriend as to all the facts and circumstances tl1at night
including their alcohol consumption and sexual acts. I felt bad to have to put these
girls through such examination but believed Mr. Long that it would have to be
accomplished in order to protect my rights.
6. \.Vhile waiting in the vestibule l witnessed Mr. Tad May, the Deputy
District Attorney, consulting with the complainant and her girHiiend. He then
joined me and ~vfr. Long. Mr. May info1111ed us that the comp]ainant did not \,Vant
2
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me to go to prison. He said that it may now be possible to enter into a plea bargain
where I might not go to prison. I was ve1-y happy to hear this news. Mr. Long then
stated that he advised me that ,ve should waive the preliminary hearing because to
VI

proceed would greatly alienate the complainant and 111.ay make her hostile

01·

antagonistic toward me when she was asked questions about drinking and sex. I
agreed that we should waive the preliminary hearing because of this new

info1111ation.
7. For the next year and a half Mr. Long kept me informed as to what was

happening. He said that until a plea agreement had been reached we must assume
that we would be going to trial and that he wou]d be filing al) the necessary
~

motions and requests to protect my interests and to gather evidence on our behalf.

He also received my approval to hire Mr. Brad Parsons, III to furtber assist hi111 in
prepating for a possible trial. He still expressed hope that the District Attorney
would agree to a plea bargain in light of the complainant's positive attitude.

8. On January 5, 2015 Tattended a proceeding in the Salt Lake County
Court for the purpose of bearing the various motions and requests that Mr. Parsons
and Mr. Long had filed. \1/hile waiting for the couit to start I witnessed .Mr. Long,
Id>

Mr. Parsons and Mr. May confen-ing for quite a long time.

:rvfr. Long and Mr.

Parsons then came to me and informed me that TVfr. 1'.1ay had agreed to reduce the
charge to ·forcible sexual abuse which was a second degree felony and not a first.

3
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They also said it would be likely that I would not face any prison time because Mr.
?vlay had expressly confirmed with Mr. Long and Mr. Parsons that the complainant

in this case did not want me to go to prison. I figured she knew that both of us
shouldn't have been so drunk that 1110111ing and that it was an unfortunate incident
that should be forgiven if I spent some time in jail.

9. They told me that the prosecuting atton1ey would recommend that I not

go to prison unless the complainant insisted I go to prison. However, my atto1neys
thought it was very improbable that this would happen in light of Mr. May's st-rong

assurance that she did not want me to serve thne in prison. I was also told by :Nfr.
Long and 1vfr. Parsons that I would be giving up all of my constitutional rights to
contest this charge against me. They believed, however, that there was a very good
like1i.hood that while I may have to serve time in the county jail I would not have to
serve time at the State Prison based upon the circumstances of the night, my prior
favorable record, and the positive attitude of the complainant. I agreed that I

,vou]d \\'aive my right to a trial and plead guilty.
10. During the hearing with the court I again heard Mr. May state that the

complainant did not \:Vant a prison term for me even though he had been unable to
contact her for several months. Based upon his statements I felt very good about
my decision 10 enter into a guilty plea. in this case.

4
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11. During January and February of this year I felt very relieved but still
apprehensive about my sentencing. I spoke with the lady from the parole
department and told her my whole story. I attended the various classes Mr. Long
~

had set up for me concen1ing sexual problems and also discussed in detail n1y life

with the private company he hired to do an evaluation on me. He informed me that
the private company thought that I should be placed on probation but should have

to serve time in a county jail for over 250 days which I thought was okay
compared to prison.

12. ln the last part of February Mr. Long ca11ed me and told me he had very
bad
~

ne\:\'S.

He informed me that the complainant had told the parole department

that she wanted me to go to prison and. that the parole department had
recommended that I go to prison under my p)ea . .I was very upset to hear this and
cou 1d tell that Mr. Long was also very upset.

13. Later Mr. Long infonned me that his private investigator had talked to

the complainant who said that she had always wanted me to go to prison fi:01n the
very beginning. I was very upset to hear th.is as was Mr. Long. He informed inc
that now my chances for going to prison was almost a sure thing because the
vj

prosecuting attorney was not obligated to recommend county jail time, the parole
department had already recommended prison, and the complainant wanted to speak
to the judge about her desire to send me to prison.
5
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14. Mr. Long informed me that he would never have recommended that I

plead guilty had he known this was really her attitude and because I listened to :t\.fr.
Long for his advice 1 would not have done so ifhe had recommended again.st it.

..;

i

'/

'. f

t

Under penally of perjury under the laws of the State of Utah, I, Robert

I~•

Iviorgan Magness hereby s_wear that the foregoing is true and co1Tect to the best of
my k.11m:vledge an.cl understanding.

.

..

:......------

St"BSCRfBED AND SWORN to before me on this 10th day of April, 2015
i11

Sa!r Lnke County~ Utah.

~::f:'.;\·· ,.: ; ·. :•·:· • · -. :·, -::~)).·..: ~· :i
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SIM GILL
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
AARON FLATER, Bar No. 9458
Deputy District Attorney
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STA TE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY
PLEA

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case Nos. 131903746
Robert Morgan Magness,
JUDGE HRUBY-MILLS
Defendant.
The State of Utah, through its counsel, SIM GILL, Salt Lake County District
Attorney, and Aaron Flater, Deputy District Attorney, hereby submits this Memorandum
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and respectfully r~quests
that this Court deny Defendant's motion.
PREFACE

The practice of law is an honorable practice in which honorable men and women
diligently labor. For the most part those that work within the profession treat each other
with courtesy, civility and dignity. The Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility
state, "Lawyers shall not, without an adequate factual basis, attribute to other counsel or
the court improper motives, purpose, or conduct. Lawyers should avoid hostile,
demeaning, or humiliating words in written and oral communications with adversaries.
Neither written submissions nor oral presentations should disparage the integrity,
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intel1igence, morals, ethics, or personal behavior of an adversary unless such matters are
directly relevant under controlling substantive law." For those reasons the State was
disappointed to read that the attorneys for the Defendant accused an esteemed colleague
of intentional misrepresentation or gross negligence when there is simply not a factual
basis to make such accusations. Throughout the case the prosecutor represented honestly
what his understanding was and at worst may have misunderstood the victim's desires
when he first met with her. This certainly does not make him guilty of intentional
misrepresentation nor gross negligence. The State asks the Court to not consider the
personal attacks on the character of the prosecutor and focus on the record as a whole of
the court proceedings.
INTRODUCTION

On January 5, 2015, Robe11 Morgan Magness (Defendant) entered a plea of guilty
in this case to the charge of Forcible Sexual Abuse. The Defendant now moves this
Court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. For the reasons noted below, the State
respectfully requests that this Court deny the Defendant's motion.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW HIS
GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE THE PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY AND
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED

Recent Utah case law addresses when cou11s may allow Defendants to withdraw
guilty pleas. In State v.Velarde the Utah Supreme Court clarified that Rule 11 governs
the taking of guilty pleas, but not their withdrawal. 2015 UT App 71, ,~ 8-9
Although rule 11 provides guidance for the entry of guilty pleas, any attempt to
withdraw that plea is governed by statute. 11 State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ~ 19, 279

2
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P.3d 371. Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(a) provides in pa11 that a "plea of guilty ...
may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly
and voluntarily made." "This statutory standard mirrors the showing necessary for
defendants to prove that their pleas are unconstitutional." Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ~ 19,
279 P.3d 371.
In Velarde the court further clarified that the existence of a factual basis for a
guilty plea "shall be determined by examining the record as a whole." Utah R. Crim. P.
11 (!). The record as a whole includes "transcripts of the plea hearing, the
circumstances surrounding the case and including the plea affidavit. State v. Velarde,
2015 UT App 71, fl~ 8-9 (citations omitted) See also State v. Trotter, 330 P.3d 1267,
1270 (Utah 2014).

In State v. Ferretti the Court rejected a Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea
in part because the plea affidavit explicitly outlined the elements, the State's burden to
prove them beyond a reasonable doubt if the case proceeded to trial, and the factual
basis for the plea. 2014 UT App 224, PS (Utah Ct. App. 2014).
In this case the record as a whole indicates that the Defendant entered his plea
knowingly and voluntarily. Defendant, with the advice of counsel, signed a Statement of
Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel confirming that his plea
was voluntary, not coerced. See Statement of Defendant in Suppo11 of Plea. His attorney
also signed the Statement confirming that the Defendant had read or was read and
understood the contents of the Statement and that the confirmations by the Defendant in
the Statement were true. On the bottom of the fourth page of the Statement it states that
"All the promises duties and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained

3
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in this statement, including those explained below;" Those words are followed by the
handwritten~language, "In exchange for the defendant's plea of guilty the prosecution·
agrees that in the event the victim does not affirmatively insist upon the prosecutor
seeking a prison commitment that the prosecutor will recommend probation and no
prison." See Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea at page 4. Explicit in
those words is the understanding that the victim may be asking for a prison commitment.
Implicit in those words is the understanding that the state was not aware of what the
victim's position on sentencing would be.
The discussion about a potential prison recommendation was further clarified in
open com1 on the record. According to the transcript provided by defense counsel, the
Defendant's own attorney said, "the Prosecution has heretofore indicated to the court that
unless the victim affirmatively requests a commitment of prison for the defendant's
behavior, that the prosecution in this matter will recommend no prison time and will
recommend probation of some form." See Transcription of Evidentiary Hearing page I 0
lines 16-19. Explicit in that statement is the understanding that the victim may request
prison. Implicit in that statement is the understanding that the State was not aware of
what the victim would request. The prosecutor explained further that the State's primary
focus was to "honor the victim's wishes." During that hearing the prosecutor explained
that although the victim did not initially request prison time, he had difficulty contacting

her and was not aware of what her position was.

See Transcription of Evidentiary
~

Hearing page 4 I ines 14-19.

Because it was made very clear to the Defendant that there was a possibility that
the victim would recommend prison, he cannot now say that her recommendation of

4
00332
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

prison makes his plea unknowing or involuntary. Defendant got the benefit of a bargain.
His charge was reduced from a first degree felony to a second degree felony. Together
with that bargain he assumed risk that the victim would recommend prison, that AP&P
would recommend prison, and the risk that the Court is not bound by any
recommendations from anyone.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the State submits this Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, and respectfully requests that the Court deny
Defendant's Motion.

DA TED this 24th day of April, 2015
SIM GILL
District Attorney for Salt Lake County

ISi Aaron Flater
Aaron Flater
Deputy District Attorney

MOTIONS:
Notice has been served upon counsel of record in the above-listed case by electronic
notification in accordance with URCP 5(b )( 1)(A)(i).
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORIGINAL

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 131903746 FS

Fil~D. DiSTHiCT C•XffiT

ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS,

Thlrn Judl~cl D:Ctrict

Defendant.

JIJN - 1 2015
Oral Argument
Electronically Recorded on
April 27, 2015

BEFORE:: THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS
Third District Courc Judge

A?PEJI.RANCES

For the State:

P.a:::-on W. Flater
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (385) 468-7600

For the Defendant:

Craig Cook
William B. ?arsons III
Larry N. Long
1 Lake·.;iew

Stansbury Park, Utah 84074
Telephone: (801)466-6311
Transcribed by: Wendy Haws, CCT
1771

South California

Avenue

Pro~o, Utah 84606
Telep:10ne: {801) 377-2927

-1FILED

SEP l 4 2015
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on March 2, 2015)

3

THE COURT: Okay, we're back on the record in the matter

4

of State of Utah ~s. Robert Magness, case No. 131903746.

5

I have appearances, lease.

6

MR. COOK: I'm Craig Coor. for the defendant.

7

MR. LONG: Larry Long for the defendant.

8

MR. PARSONS: William Parsons.

9

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

Could

10

MR. FLATER: Aaron Flater for the State.

11

THE COURT: All right, thank you; and Mr. Magness is

12

here as well.

All right, so I've reviewed the opposition filed

13

by the State.

So I have read everything.

14

else I sho~ld know?

Is there anything

15

M?.. :;:-r.r.-rrP. ·

16

MR. COOK: No, your Honor.

17

THE COURT: AlJ right, Ro no one wishes to make oral

18

, don't thir:k so.

argument, then?

19

MR. COOK: Oh, yeah.

20

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

21

MR. COOK: Right.

22

THE COURT: Now will be the time.

23

MR. COOK: Your Honor, i f ! can sit down, I have a bad

24

25

back right now, and standing up -THE COURT: That's certainly -- and we're clearly

-2-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

picking you up on the record, so that's fine.

2

MR. COOK: Okay, fine.

If it please the Court, I'm

3

Craig Cook, representing the defendant in this matter related

4

to this guilty plea.

5

as the Court knows, we just received the memo from the State

6

today at 2 -- one at 2 o'cloc~, and I read ic basically like

7

:he Court.

8

more depth reply had we had time, but anyway that's how it is.

9

Just on a couple of procedural matters,

So, you know, we may have been able to do a little

The important thing is I think, your Honor, is that

10

there is no counter affidavits filed by the State.

11

for purpcses of our motion today we have to assume that all of
our tacts are true.

So I think

Then the legal ramifications, of course,

13

would be decided; but I think the facts as we state them will

i4

have to be assumed as given, basically.

15

So going over ~his case in the chronological crder that

16

it occur=ed, on April 12:h, 2012, this was when the incident

17

occurred in the defendant's home involving the complainant.

18

It was an overnight party of drinking, and the next morning is

19

when the alleged assaul~ occurred.

20

The defendant hired Mr. Long. He began representing

21

him.

22

and at that time, as stated in the affidavits, Mr. Long was

23

prepared to thoroughly cross examine the complainant and her

24

girlfriend and some other witnesses possibly as to what had

25

happened on that night or :hat morning.

On June 6, 2013 a preliminary hearing was scheduled,
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1

Prier to going into the preliminary hearing, however,

2

the

3

Mr. Long and the defendan~ and said the complainant has decided

4

sr.e d,:.:es not ·.-,ant cl,~fcndarit to go t.o prisor:, .;,nd she's sort of

5

optimistic that something can be resolved.

6

Mr. May of the District Attorney's Office approached

We are, too.

Upon hearing that news, that she was not vindictive,

7

Mr. Long a~d the defendant decided to waive the preliminary

8

hearing, based on Mr. Long's experience that if you do have

9

a favorable complainant in a case like this, if you put them

10

o~ the stand in a preliminary hearing and cross examine them,

11

t~~t ~hat could well ctange their disposition.

12

~c~

13

representation that she would be -- she did not want him to go

14

:c prison.

15

So they chose

~o -- not to nave a prelim~nary hearir.g, based upon that

During the remainder of January, they filed -- there

16

was no plea agreement made.

17

DNA evidence and suppression of evidence and things like this;

18

and in January 2014 his investigator Mr. Shaun Kane spoke to

19

~he complai~ant, who -- :o find out exactly what her version of

20

the story was, and he was told that she basically said, "Well,

21

I thought it was already over.

22

already pled guilty, because I was told all I would have to do

23

:-1ow is go to Court and talk to tr.em about the sentencing."

24
25

So Mr.

Mr. Long filed various motions for

I thought we'd already -- he'd

Ka::e said, "Well, you need to talk to the

District Attorney.

I don't know what's going on, but that's
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1

not my knowledge of the case.

2

went on again for another year with various motions being

3

p!."esented to the Court.

4

these various rr,otions and n1otions to suppress and di f fe!."ent

5

things were before the Court on an evidentiary hearing; and it

6

was at this time that the -- Mr. May approached Mr. Long again,

7

and co-Counsel, and suggested that a deal could be struck.

8

At that point, they -- he represented that he was

9

So chat was it for that.

Then finally in January of 2015 all

willing to go to a second-degree felony on the assumption that

10

the victirr. did not want the defendant to go to prison.

11

again he said, "Yes , I ' m sure she does n ' t

12

prison, and we're very confident of this."

13

Ic

1r1

Once

ant him to go to

So on the record, as we quot~d in our memora~dum,

14

there was a colloquy between the Court and the Co~nsel, and

15

the :o~rt specifically asked about t~e victim, and he said,

16

"Well, the victim doesn't want him to go to prison.u

17

upon that representation, a plea agreement was struck where

18

it was stated that the prosecutor would represent -- would

19

.recommend probation as long as the complainant did not wish

20

him to go co prison.

21

by everyone that she did not want him to go to prison.

22

why Mr. Long and the defendant agreed to waive -- basica:ly all

23

rights to a jury trial and plead guilty.

24
25

So u~der that scenario it was assumed

Then Mr. tt,agness went. to

to counseli~g.

Based

CGLmS•:?

ling.

That's

He's been going

He's been unde=going alcohol rehabilita~ion and
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1

various other programs.

2

before a private company hired by Mr. Long, this other company,

3

and you k~ow, he was very cooperative in every respect.

4

He did his AP&P interview.

He went

So in February of 2815, just a couple of rnonths after

5

this, suddenly the AP&P =eport co~es in and it's very negative.

6

It says tha: they recommend that Mr-. Magness go to prison, and

7

that the cornplainan~ wanted him to go to prison, wanted him to

8

at least serve three years, based upon what she had suffered.

9

So the quotation in the pre-sentence report was very

10

vindictive.

11

she believed he had done to her.

12

tio~ that :he defense had that there was a problem with this

13

representation of her -- of her desires.

You know, she wanted revenge, basically, for what
So this was the fi=st indica-

14

So tz·,en on !•~arch pt, 2015 l~r. Kane, the investigator,

15

contacted the complainant and spoke with her on the phone, and

16

we have a transcrip: of that in the file.

17

she had never said she didn't want him to go to prison.

18

wanted him to be on the sex registry list, but she always

19

want~d him to go to prison based from the very beginning.

20

Basically she said
She

So, you kno~, from her statement on that phone conver-

21

sation, it's obviously in conflict with what Mr. May said in

22

his various representations to defense and to the Court.

23

April lO t ", based on that, we filed a motion to set aside the

24

guilty verdict and-- or ~he guilty plea and to reopen basically

25

the entire case.

On
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1

So we have cwo grounds, essentially, really I guess

2

it's all basically the same; but our first foremost ground is

3

prosecutorial misconduct.

4

civility with lawyers and treating Counsel of the side fairly,

5

which we of course believe in; but in ~his particular case, you

6

know, we have an obligation to defend our client. A prosecutor,

7

you know, has a very high duty to disclose things that maybe a

8

civil attorney would not.

9

rule of disclosing evidence and not misrepresenting things.

10

The State raises the question about

I mean, the Brady -- the whole Brady

So, you know, we hate to do

-i ...·-,

;....,,,..
you might say, ....
.......

11

it's something that has to be done.

i2

clearly a -- either an intentional misrepresentation or a

13

completely gross negligent effort on the part of Mr. May to

14

find out the intent of this -- of this witness.

15

In this case there was

Because of that, they conveyed this information to

16

Mr. Long, which seriously modified the defense of this case.

17

The main -- the main element to begin with was the waiver of

18

the preliminary hearing.

19

a case like this because of the ability to cross examine the

20

complainant, find out the whole history of what happened that

21

night, the friends.

22

That is a very important feature in

It is a very critical thing for a defendant to be able

23

to do; and had it not been for this representation they would

24

not have waived it. They would have proceeded and obtained, you

25

know -- whether they would have obtained valuable information

-7-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

now is not known, but they certainly didn't obtain anything

2

because they weren't able to.

3

Secondly, after the various motions and efforts for

4

discovery and suppression, all that was given up, too, because

5

of the fact that the plea agreement was entered into. Therefore

6

all of these various defenses which may have had an effect on

7

the defense, again we~e waived on the very assumption that she

8

was favorably going to not re::ommend

9

or didn't want prison.

So this was another mctiva~ion which made him give up

10

all of his rights to jury trial, to all the discovery, every-

11

thing else.

12

complainant in a case like this is vindictive, there's a much

13

higher probability of nc -- no prison, as opposed to prison on

14

a second-degree felo~y.

15

Mr. May's representation to the Court, that this would be the

16

case.

It was based simply on the assumption that when a

They were very confident, based upon

17

The State argues, "Well, they knew it could change,u

18

you know, that it was conditioned upon the fact that it could

19

change.

20

time this representation was ~ade, she had already adamantly

21

decided she wanted him ~o go to prison.

22

of changing.

23

of what everyone lncluding the Court had decided.

24
25

She may change her mind or whatever; but at the very

So it was not a matter

It was a matter that it was completely opposite

I've kind of -- I kind of have an analogy.

If

you

have a plea bargain saying the prosecutor woi..:ld recommend
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1

probation if the Jazz lost the NBA finals, that's one thing;

2

but i f you say they .,.,ould reco:r:mend probation only if tt:ey

3

win the NBA finals, that's another thing.

4

what happened here, the complete change of what the defendant

5

believed were the facts occurred by this misrepresentation or

6

gross negligence, however you want to say it.

7

That's essentially

So we quoted, I think, cases, your Honor, that shows

8

that this type of behavior is critical for a defendant to be

9

able to rely upon the integrity of the prosecu~ion, and it

10

would be no different :han had the prosecutor informed the

11

defendant that they found a gun that they hadn't actually

i2

found, or that chey didn't find a gun that they had found. So

13

it goes to the very thinking of the defense ~earn based upon

14

what the prosecution is obligated to correctly and adequately

15

report.

16

The second part of the argument, but which is really

17

tied into this, is the statute itself, which is 77-13-6, which

18

says that a plea can be overturned if it was not voluntarily

19

or knowingly made.

20

about.

21

an illusory promise that soreething can occur, then you're not

22

actually ~ulfilling the bargain that you're making with ~he

23

State.

24
25

It's the same thing we were just talking

As tha Supreme Court said in several cases, if you have

We've cited seve~al causes in which the defendant
believed something would occur, and it didn't occur because
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1

of various impossibilities or misrepresentations.

2

that's the same situation here, that had they known that the

3

defendant -- o.:- the complainant v,as goir1g to recom.'Tiend prison

4

very ve~effiently as she did to the Court when she made her

5

stateme~t, this deal would not have been made because there

6

was just toe much co lose to not be able to go to trial.

7

So basically that's our second argument.

We believe

Then the

8

third, as we said here, is that what we're -- the basis of the

9

bargain was to try to 9et the State to recommend probation; and

10

you know, if the Court chose to just follow your own recom --

11

your own feeling without the .recommendation of the prosecutor,

12

then -- and actually give a probacion sentence, then we would

13

withdraw :hese motions, because that would then give us che

14

benefit of ~he bargain that we expected.

15

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

16

MR. FLATER: Are you ready for the response, your

17

Honor?

18

THE COURT: Yes, I am.

19

MR. FLATER: Okay, than~ you.

Your Honor, I think a

20

lot of this discussion scrt of just ~uddies the water.

21

important analysis here is what happened at the time defendant

22

entered his plea.

23

the Co~rt to withdraw his guilty plea.

24
25

The

He's asking for the Court -- for leave of

His claim is that he didn't enter his plea knowingly

and volun~arily.

So the most important analysis is to look at

-10-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

what happened when he did in fact enter his plea.

2

at least two different ways in which the agreement between the

3

defendant and the S~ate was put on the record at that time, and

4

which indicated what the agreement was.

There were

5

The first way that was put on the record is the state-

6

ment of the defendant in support of the guilty plea and certif-

7

icate of Counsel.

8

of that document, it indicates that the entire promises and

9

agreements of the plea agreement are fully contained in the

10
11

In that document on page 4 at the bottom

statement.

It says, "In exchange for the defendant's plea of

12

guilty, the prosecution ag:ees that in the event the victim

13

does not affirmatively insist upon the prosecute~ seeking

14

a prison commitmer.t, that the prosecution will recommend

15

probation and no prison."

16

As pointed out in the

in the memora~dum, there's

17

two understandings that are clear from those words.

18

that the victim may come to Court and request prison.

19

that the prosecutor was not aware of what the victim's position

20

would be, that the defendant wasn't aware of what che victim's

21

position would be.

22

what ~he position of the victim would be.

23

No. 1 was
No. 2,

In fact, it was an unknown at that time

That was clarified orally, as well, on the record,

24

in the transcript provided by the defendant.

25

own attorney indicated essentially the same -- the same agree-

His own -- his
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1

ment and the same understanding was that the prosecution had

2

indicated chat unless the victim affirmatively requests a

3

commitment of prison for the defendant's behavior, that the

4

prosecution will recommend no prison time, and will recommend

5

probation of some form.

6

Those same words indicate the same understanding.

7

No. 1, that the victim may in £act come to Court and request

8

prison; and that the State was not aware of what the victim

9

would request when she came to Court.

The prosecutor further

10

explained that the State's primary focus was just to honor the

11

vi ct i rn ' s w J. s n es .

12

Altho~gh he hadn't -- and during t~at same hearing the

13

prosecutor explained that although the victim didn't initially

14

request prison time whe~ he met with her chat he had difficulty

15

contacting her, and wasn't aware of what her position was.

16

I guess at this point I would take just a moment to

17

address a couple of things raised by defendant with regards to

18

~hat.

19

contact the victim and ascertain that she did in fact want

20

prison, and as she indicated frcm the beginning, that Mr. May

21

is somehow guilty of intentional misrepresentation to the Court

22

o= gross negligence for failing to explain or understand what

23

the victim's position was, in a transcription of the phone call

24

~hat Mr. Kane had with the victim, was provided to the Court as

25

well -- and I don't dispute any of the -- any of the facts or

He indicates that because his investigator was able to
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1

the transcription of that phone call.

2

probably -- for purposes of this hea=ing I won't dispute it --

3

i : appears that the victim indicated that her primary concern,

4

even when she was speaKing to Mr. Kane, was that he be on the

5

sex offend~r registry.

6

It ap?ears that it was

If that was in fact also comr,1unicated to M::-. May,

7

that her primary concern was that he be on the sex offender

8

registry, he may very \l-1ell have understood he!" to mean "That's

9

my focus. That's my gcal. I want hirn to be on the sex offender

10

registry," he may have misunderstood, or she may have not fully

11

co~nunicated to him that she also, i~ addition to that, wanted

12

a prison commitment.

13

He believes, and it's clear based on the prosecutor's

14

sta~ements from on the r~cord, that he believed that she didn't

15

want that.

16

to the Court that it ~as essentially a misunderstanding that

17

Mr. May and the victim may have misunderstood one another, but

18

I believe that's exactly why Mr. May wasn't clear on what the

19

victim ?r:anted.

20

If there was a misunderstanding, I would submit

That's exactly why he stated the agreement on the

21

record :he Hay that it was s-::ated.

22

to Court and ask fer p~ison; a~d he's not going to obligate the

23

State to go contrary to the victim's wishes, because that's

24

what she may want to do.

25

made the decision to ~=ticulate -- a~ticulate it in s~ch a way

That the victim may come

So because he was unclear of that, he
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1

to protect the victim's rights and opportunity to come to Court

2

and ask for prison.

3

It was clear that che defendant understood as well

4

that r.hat was just a recommendation from the State, from the

5

victim, from ar.ybody else.

6

wanted to do; and in fact, AP&P can do whatever it wants to

7

do.

8

was submitted to the Court also made a prison recommendation.

9

I wo~ld ask the Court to take judicial notice that the Adult

10

Probation and Parole reports frequently make recommendations

11

wholly independent of what victim's desires are, what the

12

State's recommendat:ions are.

13

reconunendat ions.

14

The Court could do whatever it

The Adult Probation and Parole pre-sentence report that

They make their own independent

It appears in this case that the defendant just took a

15

calculated risk.

16

degree felony.

17

and wouldn't come to Court and wouldn't recommend prison.

18

there was negligence I submit that the defendant also shares

19

some -- some blame in failing to ascertain what the victim's

20

wishes were before the plea; because it was clear that the

21

State could recommend prison if :hat's what the -- if that's

22

what the victim wanted.

23

He got the benefit of the bargain, a secondWas hoping that the victim wouldn't show up
If

The defendant has shown that he's capable of contacting

24

the victim and interviewing her and ascertaining her wishes.

25

If he wanted to make it absolutely clear before the sentencing,
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1

he had the opportunity and the right to contact the victim to

2

attempt to determine her wishes before he entered his plea.

3

chose not to, and made that calculated risk.

4

He

Now that he made th~ risk and entered his plea and

5

admitted his guilt, there's ~o legal -- legally sufficient

6

reason for him to withdraw his plea.

7

ingly and voluntarily and with a calculated risk; and now he

8

has to face the consequences of his decisions.

9

10
11

The plea was made k~ow-

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

Mr. Cook, anything

further?

MR. COOK: Yes, just a brief reply, your Honor.

Well,

12

I guess for starters we could say that the representa~io~s

13

made by Counsel are fine and good, but we have no affidavit

14

cf Mr. May as to any of these statesents whether they -- what

15

actually occurred from the

16

suppositions I don't think can really be taken in this case

17

to contradict what actually are in these affidavits.

18
19

from his point of view.

His

Secondly, I think the colloquy in the Court during the
during the guilty plea is very important, because it isn't

20

quite as nebulous as Counsel would say.

21

-- he quoted Mr. Parsons, who said t~at "It's understood the

22

prose:::utor will recommend no prison time and Hill re:commend

23

probation."

24

25

'I'h(::n Mr. May says,

The -- Mr. Parsons

"That's cor.rect,

your Honor.

Our

recommendat.::..on is sinply that we would honor the victim's
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1

wishes.

2

vie' !'e not bound to not recommend prison,

3

not seeking a prison sentence.

4

reco.mrner1dation does rwt bind the State in any way as to jail."

5

Then he goes on.

6

If the victim were asking for a prison sentence,
and the victim is

That's not her request.

That

·So he specifically says that's not her request, and

7

she is not seeking a prison sentence.

8

"Well, we're not quite sure what she's going to do."

9

very -- a very powerful statement to the contrary.

10

So it was not just a
It was

Secondly, the transcript of the phone conversation

11

where Counsel is saying, "Well, he-- she may have been confused

12

or not really pointed out she wanted prison" is again not quite

13

accurate.

14

basically that they -- he wanted to clarify whether Thad May,

15

the prosecutor at a hearing, believed you to not want Robert co

16

go to prison.

17

In the -- in the questioning Mr. Kane says that

This is on page 4.

She says, "No, I didn't say that."

Mr. Kane says,

18

"Okay," and she says, "I didn't say that I did not want him

19

to go to prison.

20

he's on the sexual offe~der's list.'

21

that. I wanted him to serve prison time, but the more important

22

thing to me was I wanted him to go on the sexual offender's

23

list."

24
25

I said,

'Well, it's more important to me that
That was like -- I said

Then later he says, "At this time did you want -- did
you want him co go to prison?"

"Yes, I felt he deserved some
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1

prison time also.u

2

this interv~ew she ~anted him to go to prison. So I don't think

3

there cou!d be a misunderstanding.

4

wanted him to go to prison.

5

You know, she repeatedly says it throughout

It seems q~ite adamant she

Now, the fi~al question here is, you know, what were we

6

-- what were we bargaining for.

7

mean, aside from the guilty plea, ~~ich is the State's focus,

8

we're also focusing upon the preliminary hearing, and the

9

waiving of that right, and the waiving of the trial itself.

10
11

Tte representation, again, I

That occurred long before the guilty plea.
By

this rep.:::·esentation of she is -- she is wanting

12

probation, she does not want him sent to prison, this affected

13

the defense of this case substantially, and cost them the

14

preliminary hearing.

15

conduct, aside from the question cf the guilty plea and the

16

language of the guilty plea.

So t~is go~s tc the prosecuccrial mis-

17

When you add the language of the guilty plea, where

18

the statements were made to this Court right in front of all

19

the people basically saying, you know, we believe that she

20

r.o, they didn't say "believe" -- we }:now she does not want the

21

prison time.

22

As far calling, I think it's quite risky for a defense

23

attorney to be calling a witness in an ongoing case to find

24

out what she desires.

25

It's o~e thing tc ask for the faces.

I ~hi~k tha: wo~ld be very, very risky.
I~'s another thing to ask
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1

what she wants, or to go into:: when there's no -- nc guilty

2

plea.

3

of the representations made in the AP&P report that completely

4

contradicced Mr. May.

5

The only reason they did inquire about that was because

So we believe, your Honor, in summary, that there

6

is sufficient grounds to reinstate the firs~ -- the original

7

charge, allow a preliminary hearing to go forth, allow all the

8

discovery that was omitted to continue, and to set this matter

9

for :rial, and of course set aside the guilty plea unless, of

10
11

course, the Court would grant probatior..

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

Thank you.
One of the -- one of

12

the issues :'m i1aving with regard to che defense's request here

13

is -- is knowing all along that the Court's not bound by any of

14

this rec:immendatio:1.

15

MR. COOK: That's true.

16

TEE COURT: In fact, :hat's a specific part of the

17

colloquy that I thought was interesting that no one made

18

reference to.

19

MR. COOK: Yes.

Well, and I think -- I think that's

20

certainly a relevant thing, but you know, it is-- nevertheless,

21

you sort of-- you're expecting certain thi~gs.

22

not bo•.md by the prosecutor's recommendation, you assume under

23

the facts that he's going to r:1ake a favorable recommendation.

24

You're not bound by the AP&P, buc you assume that the victim is

25

goi~g to give a favorable impression.

Although you're

-18-
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1

You're not bound by her representations, but you know,

2

all these things combine to ma~e it so that a defendant is

3

still optimistic that something is going to happen based upon

4

a set of facts that isn't present.

5

can do this, it's a whole different scenario when you -- when

6

you have a very vindictive claimant as opposed to a very

7

cooperative or a very forgiving one.

8

9

Even though they know you

THE COURT: But despite all of that, when

after

M~. May did his colloquy and -- well, his putt~ng on the record

10

on June -c; :.r. , just to make sure everybody was clear, I went back

11

ar:d I said, "Well, you understand the State

12

not bound by any of this?u

13

sentation and the defense made representatio~s, I reminded

14

everybody it doesn't matter; the Court's not bound by it.

15

everybody's on notice.

that the Court's

Because every time he made a repre-

So

16

MR. COOK: Uh-huh.

17

THE COURT: Mr. Parsons, "That's correct, as we have so

18

explained to our client."

19

~otice that that was the situacion.

20

a hard time overcomi~g that

So everybody was clear

clearly on

So that's what I'm having

21

MR. COOK: Uh-huh.

22

THE COURT: -- because we specifically discussed that

23

the Court's going to do whatever it wants to do based on this

24

info.

25

MR. COOK: Sure, but t~e difference is thac we're --
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1

they're counting on a 90 -- a r.igh probability of something

2

occurring, er the basis to make that plea, and now the proba-

3

bility is completely switched.

4

agreemer.c, the victim or complainant was adamant of him going

5

tc prison, which was completely different than what was repre-

6

sented.

7

At the time they made this

Granted, che Court cannot go by the recommendations or

8

not, bu~ you know,

9

would be a favorable recommendation that would be favorable to

they were under the mistaken belief that it

10

the Court.

11

time it was signed because she didn't

· 12

In fact,

it was a done -- it was a dead deal at the

she wanted him to go

to prison and would continue to want him to go to prison.

So

13

there was no chance of a recommendation from the prosecutor.

14

Even chough the Court does have discre:ion, we lest that chance

15

to influence the Court by the prosecutor's recommendation.

16
17

THE COURT: Dees the S:ate have anything further, since
I allowed defense additional

18

MR. FLATER: Your Honor, I have the same -- the sarne

19

issues and the same -- and the same problem.

20

aware, No. 1, that the victim ~ight come to Court and ask for

21

prison.

22

ask for prison, recommend prison.

23

The defendant was

No. 2, that the State in turn might come to Court and

In fact, the Sta::e hasn't even made a sentencing

24

reco~nendation yet.

25

about, as far as I know, I don't believe the State's even made

I think a lot of what they're complaining
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1

a recommendation at this point.

2

come to Court and made her recorrJnendation.

3

even before he entered his plea that she may do that, and she

4

may come in and ask for prison.

5

It's just that the victim has

It was clear that

No. 2, that the pre-sentence report would -- could

6

make a contrary reccrnnendation; and No. 3, that the Court was

7

not bound by any of those recommendations.

8

knowing all of those things, still chose to go ahead and enter

9

his plea.

The defendant,

He took a calculated risk, hoping that the recom-

10

rnendations would be favorable.

11

buyer's remorse now.

12

believe that the recommendations are beneficial to him.

13

wa~ts to back out of the plea that was very legally valid and

14

legi t.ir.-.a te.

15

They were not.

It seems like

He wants to back out because he doesn't
So he

'MR. COOK: Judge, may I make~ statement.

16

THE CO!JRT: Sure.

17

MR. COOK: Thank you.

Just briefly, Judge.

I would

18

assert, your Honor, having 41 years of practice in the field,

19

that the system would fail in its entirety if we weren't in a

20

position where the vast, vast majority of the time the Courts

21

follow the re•:::ommer1dations that are jointly made, especially a

22

recommend.~tion made by a prosecu:or.

23

It is the no~m, it is just simply good practice for

24

Counsel in the defense ~ndustry to assume that prosecutorial

25

recom.'Tlenclations are going to be highly pers1..1as.ive to the Court.
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1

We always know a Court can change its mind and can deviace.

2

We recognize that; but a vast, vast majority of the time we

3

are entitled to rely upon the expectation that the Court will

4

follow the recommendation made by the prosecution.

5

I have to say.

Thanks.

THE COURT: Thank you.

6

That's all

I really dislike delaying this

7

any further, because this has been a substantial delay which

8

has been extremely frustrati~g to the Court.

9

goi~g to take the matter under advisement.

However, I'm
I will give you

10

another date.

11

mean~irne -- but if not, we'll call it a ruling/sentencing

12

hearing.

13

be a sentencing.

My hope is to issue a written ruling.

In the

So depending on what the ~uling is, ~here will also

TJ, how many do we have on May 11 th ?

14

COU~T CLERK: It's nOL too bad.

15

THE COURT: Okay, we'll have you back on May 11:h on the

16

9 o'clock law and mot~on calendar.

17
18

MR. COOK: May I inquire, your Honor, what will occur
precisely on that date?

19
20

THE COURT: Well, if I don't issue a wri:ten ruling in
between,

I will give my ruling.

21

MR. COOK: At that time?

22

THE COURT: Correct.

23

MR. COOK: In the alternative, if ycu have given a

24

written ruling, will that be a continuation of the sentencing

25

process?
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1

THE COURT: Even i i -- I will either rule previously,

2

and it will be then a sentencing or a scheduling conference,

3

depending on what the ruling is.

4

day and it will be a ruling,

5

scheduling conference or a sentencing, okay?

Otherwise, you'll come that

and it will in turn lead into a

6

MR. COOK: Yes, ma'am.

7

THE COURT: So -- anj the State's clear on that as

8

Thank you.

well?

9

MR. ~AY: Yes, your Honor.

10

THE COURT: All right.

11

MR. COOK: A: 9 a.m., your Hono!?

12

THE COURT: Correct.

13

MR. COOK: Thank you, your Honor.

14

THE COURT: All ri,Jht,

15

the 11";.t. of May.

Okay,

so I ~-1ill see,

MR. ~~.Z:..Y: Thank you.

17

MR. COOK: That's all we have.

19
20
21

9 a.m. on

thank you.

16

18

then,

May we be excused, your

Honor.
THE COURT: Yes, thank you, and I do believe that
concludes our afternoon calendar.
(Hearing concluded)
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

MAY 0 6 2015
By:

Salt Lake County

.,,("J
I

------~-Deputy Clerk

IN THE TffiRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

RULING AND ORDER
Case No. 131903746

vs.

ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS,

Judge Elizabeth A. Hruby-Mills

Defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant's Amended Motion for Leave to Withdraw Guilty Plea,
Reinstate Preliminary Hearing, and Reinstate All Prior Filed Motions and Requests ("Motion").
The Court has reviewed the moving, opposition, and reply papers. A hearing was held on April
27, 2015. Having considered the briefing and arguments of counsel, the Court now rules as
follows.
On April 12, 2012, Defendant was charged with ~pe, a first degree felony. On January
5, 2015, Defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge of Forcible Sexual Abuse, a second degree

felony. With the advice of counsel, Defendant signed a Statement of Defendant in Support of
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Cotmsel ("Statement") confirming that his plea was volW1tary.
That Statement was also signed by his counsel confirming that the Defendant had read or was
read and understood the contents of that Statement and that the confirmations by the Defendant
in the Statement were true. The bottom of page four of the Statement reads as follows:
All the promises, duties and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained
in this statement, including those explained below: In exchange for the Defendant's plea
of guilty the prosecution agrees that in the event the victim does not affirmatively insist
upon the prosecutor seeking a prison commitment that the prosecutor will recommend
probation and no prison.
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Before signing the Statement, the prosecution had represented to the Defendant that, as of
the time of initial intake, the victim's impression was that she would not seek prison time.
Defendant was aware that the prosecution had not communicated with the victim since getting
her initial impression. At an evidentiary hearing on January 5, 2015, the prosecution explained
that the State's "recommendation is simply that we would honor the victim's wishes." On March
2, 2015, the victim appeared in court and, in part, made the following statement:
As far as what I believe should be dealt to you, I'm asking the Judge to sentence you twoand-a-half years in prison, the same sentence you've dealt me. A prison I've been in,
waiting for this to be over. I also want you to be on the sexual offenders list.
Defendant contends that the prosecution made a material misrepresentation when it stated
that the victim did not want Defendant to go to prison. According to Defendant, this material
misrepresentation, which allegedly induced Defendant to accept the guilty plea, amounted to
prosecutorial misconduct which violated the Defendant's due process rights and caused him to
forego his right to a jury trial. The Court disagrees. Based on the record, the Court cannot
conclude that the prosecutor made "affirmative statements contrary to what it knows to be the
truth." United States v. Universita, 298 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1961). Nor has the prosecutor
intentionally made knowing use of false evidence by misrepresenting the nature of the victim's
wishes. Rather, the prosecutor represented that, at the time he spoke with the victim, she was not
seeking prison time. There is no evidence that these representations were contrary to what the
prosecutor knew to be true.
Next, Defendant contends that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea under Utah Code
Ann.§ 77.. 13-6(2)(A) because the plea was not knowing and voluntary. The Court respectfully

disagrees. Contemplating voluntariness, the Utah Supreme Court recognized:
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the
actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper
harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to
the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274 (Utah 1988). Based on the record, the Court cannot

characterize the prosecutor's statements as misrepresentations, unfulfilled, or unfulfillable
promises. All of the statements on the record made by the prosecution were some version of an
2
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explanation that the victim initially did not appear to want the Defendant to go to prison, but the
prosecution's recommendation remained consistently contingent on whatever the victim wanted.
Importantly, Counsel for the Defendant, after the Court found that the Defendant knowingly and
voluntarily entered into the plea, further represented to the Court that his client knew that the
Court was not bound by the recommendation made by the prosecution.
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has explained:
In order to assist courts in determining whether a plea is knowingly and voluntarily made,
we created rule 11. Rule 11 highlights important rights that defendants must understand
in order for their pleas to be valid. By addressing those rights with the defendant in the
plea hearing, district courts can test the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea and
create a record of their inquiry. Indeed, where a district court complies with all the
provisions of rule 11, the court forecloses many potential arguments that the defendant's
plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27,124, 279 P.3d 371, 378. Here, there are no allegations that Rule

11 was violated. The Court is satisfied that there was compliance with Rule and that Defendant
knowingly and voluntarily entered into a guilty plea, particularly where "both the plea colloquy
and the plea agreement, which was incorporated into the plea hearing record, clearly set forth the
charges and the alleged conduct by [Defendant] that corresponded with the elements of the
charges, in compliance with rule 11." State v. Candland, 2013 UT 55,118,309 P.3d 230.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Amended Motion
for Leave to Withdraw Guilty Plea, Reinstate Preliminary Hearing, and Reinstate All Prior Filed
Motions and Requests is DENIED, consistent with the Court's Ruling above. The Court
anticipates sentencing the Defendant at the date previously set, May 11, 2015.
This Ruling and Order is the order of the Court, and no additional order is required to be
prepared in this matter .
DATED this~ day of May, 2015.
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CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713
CRAIG S. COOK, PC
3645 East Cascade Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Phone: (801) 485-8123

E-mai I: k iskaar@.att.net

WILLIAM B. PARSONS III (#2535)
P.O. Box 22626

Salt Lake City, Utah 84122
Phone: (801) 272-3905
Facsimile: (80 I) 273-3906

LARRY LONG (#1989)
L. LONG LA WYER, INC.
341 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801)322-4666
E-mail: llon~ra;Jlonglawyer.corn
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO CLARIFY THE RULING
AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW GUILTY
PLEA, REINSTATE PRELIMINARY
HEARING, AND REINSTATE ALL
PRIOR FILED MOTIONS AND
REQUESTS

Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS,

CASE No. 131903746

Defendant.
JUDGE: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS

1
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COMES NOW, the Defendant, ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, by and through his
counsel of record, Craig S. Cook, William B. Parsons and Larry Long, and hereby respectfully
moves this Court for a clarification of the Ruling and Order ("Ruling and Order") issued by this
Cou11 on May 6, 2015, in conjunction with the Defendant's Motions to Withdraw Guilty Plea,
Reinstate Preliminary Hearing, and Reinstate all Prior Filed Motions and Requests. The Ruling.
and Order contains no specified Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law. Further, in a plain
reading of the Ruling and Order it is not clear where the Court relied on factual determinations
and where the Court made legal conclusions.
Moreover, it is entirely unclear the basis for the Court's apparent factual determinations.
The only affidavits or other factual evidence presented to the Court in the pleadings on this issue
came from the Defendant. The Prosecution failed to provide any affidavit, transcript, recording,
or other evidence as to any prior statements the alleged victim made to the police, the
Prosecution, or any other party concerning her desire to have the Defendant sentenced to prison.
All such information was duly requested by the Defendant during discovery and should have
already been provided to the Defendant's legal counsel. But for reasons unknown to the
Defendant this information was intentionally withheld. Critically, in spite of the lack of evidence
presented by the Prosecution, the Court made a determination that the Prosecution did not make
a material misrepresentation.
The Defendant is entitled to a clear and unambiguous ruling on his Motion. In order to
apply the proper standard of review, the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Comt of Appeals
require a clear delineation between the trial court's factual findings and legal conclusions. This
Court did not make such delineation in its Ruling and Order. Accordingly, the Defendant

2
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respectfully requests the Court clarify the basis for its denial of the Defendant's Motions to
Withdraw Guilty Plea, Reinstate Preliminary Hearing, and Reinstate All Prior Filed Motions and
Requests; make c)ear and unambiguous Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in conjunction
with the Ruling and Order; and clarify the basis for the Court's factual determinations.

DATED this 11111 day of May, 2015.

Isl Larry Long
Larry Long for
L. LONG LA WYER, INC.
Attorney for Defendant

3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 11 th day of May, 2015, I caused to be served via e-mai 1/e-

fil ing/fax/mai l/delivery a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO CLARIFY THE
RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW GUILTY
PLEA, REINSTATE PRELIMINARY HEARING, AND REINSTATE ALL PRIOR
FILED MOTIONS AND REQUESTS to the following:

Salt Lake District Court

450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

...
Ci,

Salt Lake County District Attorney Offices

111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

/s/ Neil Crabtree
Clerk

4
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORJGl,~AL

t.iJ·
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

l
) Case No.

vs.
ROBERT MORGAN Kt;GNESS,

Defendant.
______________

)
}
)
)
)

JUN - 1 2015
lt;,\LT LAKii

Sentencing Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
May 11, 201S

BE:FORE: THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS
Third District Court J~dge

APPEARANCES
for the State:

Aaron Flater
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
lll East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (385) 468-7600

For the Defendant:

William B. Parsons III
Larry N. Lona
1 Lakeview
Stansbury Park, Utah 84074
Telephone: (801) 466-6311

Transcribed by: Wendy Haws, CCT
1771 South California Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 377-2927
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1

P R O C E E D I NG S

2

(Electronically recorded on May 11, 2015)

3

THE COURT: All right, so Mr. Magness.

4

131903746; and we're set for sentencing today?

5

MR. LONG: Yes, your Ho~or.

This matter is

Although apparently the

6

ruling was entered with the Court on che 6 th , which was Wednes-

7

day, but no electronic notification was ever sent to Mr. Flater

8

at the DA's office or Mr. ?arsons, me, nor Mr. Cook.

9

call on Friday afternoon from Mr. Cook that the ruling was to

10

I got a

deny tr.emotion.

11

So I called Or. Mahea, trying to get a hold of him.

12

I haven't received any return calls from him.

13

to be here to testify in terms of he'd been in treatment for

14

the last two-and-a-half years with Dr. Mahea.

15

Honor to have the input on that.

16

that were scheduled to show up, but we didn't have the time to

17

contact them.

18
19

We expected him

We wanted your

We had about over 30 people

THE COURT: I specifically asked if anyone thought we
needed a special setting, and I was told no by both sides.

20

MR. LONG: Well, that may have been the case at the

21

time, but I think it would certainly be advisable if we could

22

have one.

23

ruling, because we thought it was rather ambiguous and we know

24

that the Court of Appeals as well as the Supreme Court wants a

25

clear record for review.

We did file this morning a motion to clarify ~he

-2-
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1

Also we filed the motion to continue the sentencing

2

based on the fact that we needed to get Dr. Maheas here to

3

testify, as well as the 30 supporters that we were trying

4

to have show up in his behalf.

5

training and bonded with a lot of people over there.

6

thought that would be significant for the Court.

He went through 220 hours of

So we

7

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

8

MR. FLATER: Your Honor, I object to the request for a

9

continuance.

I'd ask -- I would ask the Court to go forward

10

with sentencing today for a number of reasons.

11

well aware, this has been previously scheduled for sentencing

12

at least twice. That sentencing had been delayed at the request

13

of the defendant.

14

As the Court is

At the motion, the evidentiary hearing, the argument

15

that we had when the Court took the matter under advisement,

16

the Court informed all parties that you would have a decision

17

by today's date, and that it would either be a sentencing or a

18

scheduling conference based on your ruling.

19

So the defendant was on notice that today may -- may

20

in fact be a sentencing.

21

the witnesses and get them here if he thought that he needed

22

people to testify.

23

documents in preparation, anticipation of sentencing, and has

24

had multiple opportunities to present whatever information he

25

wanted to to the Court and/er was under notice that today would

He had ample time to contact all of

He's previously submitted quite a few

-3-
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1

be set for scheduling if the Court denied the -- I mean, excuse

2

ne, that today would be set for sentencing if the Court denied

3

his motio~.

4

The Court gave no indication of whether that wo~ld

5

be in advance at the hearing or at the hearing itself.

6

Court said, ''I may come to the bench on this day a~d deny your

7

motion; and if that's the case, then we will go forward with

8

sentencing.u

9

object to any more continuances on the sentencing, and I would

10

The

So based on that procedural history, I strongly

ask the Court to go forward.

11

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

12

MR. LONG: Did your Honor have an opportunity to read

13

our written motion to continue?

14

THE COURT: I did.

15

MR. LONG: Oh, okay.

16

THE COURT:

17

Anything further?

you.

I took a brief break --

from the bench and I read that.

Thank

Anything else I should know?

18

MR. LONG: I don't believe so, your Honor.

19

THE COURT: All right, I am -- I have reviewed those

20

documents that were filed this norning, and I am denying the

21

motions to co~tinue the sentence, and to clarify the ruling

22

further.

23

on the last motion that I would likely even issue the ruling

24

t~is morning.

25

give you additional time.

I did nake it clear at that oral argument on the --

So the fact that you got it earlier should just

-4-
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1

I also indicated, as the State has indicated as well,

2

that I would -- today we were going forward either with the

3

sentencing or with a scheduling confere~ce, depending on how I

4

ruled.

5

sentencing.

I've ~ade that ruling, and so I'm ready to proceed with

I knew we have been set for sentencing several times

6
7

on this matter, and I would note we've heard from the victim in

8

the case.

9

the point of any errors or omissions in the pre-sentence report

10

However, I'm not sure whether we've ever gotten to

that need to be addressed.

11

MR. PARSONS: We have not actually had the opportunity

12

-- if it please the Court, William Parsons, your ~onor, on

13

behalf of the defendant

14

of making the statement in behalf of the defendant.

15

par~icular point in time I would like to have the opportunity

16

to do so.

17

18
19

we have not had the opportunity
At this

THE COURT: All right, chank you, but any errors or
omissions that you were (inaudible) -MR. PARSONS: There are a couple of minor errors, but

20

nothing of significance in the pre-sentence report that we wish

21

to address.

22

THE

23

MR. PARSONS: I would inquire of the Court, has the

COURT: All right, thank you.

24

Court had the opportu~ity of the

25

report that we have produced?

reviewing the defense based
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1

THE COURT: I have.

2

MR. PARSONS: Thank you very much.

3

THE COURT: Thank you.

4

MR. PARSONS: With that in mind, your Honor, if I may

5

proceed?

6

THE COURT: Yes.

7

MR. PARSONS: Thank you.

8

of age, your Honor.

9

valley.

He was born and raised in the Salt Lake

He's been a welder all of his life.

10

home.

11

has no prior felonies.

12

of any character whatsoever.

13

The defendant is 55 years

He has two children.

He owns his own

He has three grand children.

He

He has no assault or sex offense record

Since this offense occurred, he has completed two-and-

14

a-half years of therapy with Dr. Mahea, who is a qualified sex

15

therapist in the community.

16

hours of Great Life Training and has been an instructor himself

17

in the Great Life program.

18

He, in addition to that, has 220

He has completed psycho-sexual evaluations including

19

the plethysmograph and the polygraph, and all tests at the

20

behest and under the direction of Dr. Mahea indicate that he

21

has no~ only interested in only sexually appropriate behavior,

22

bo:h age and sexually context, with no apparent in:erest in

23

deviation of any character.

24
25

Alcohol testing monitor has been on this g€ntleman
fer over two-and-a-half years, and there have been no alcohol
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1

consumed by him since the date of the inc~dent, which was

2

almosc three years ago.

3

~he~e are alcohol circumstances associated with this incident,

4

and r.is alcohol-free status is very telling of his commitment

5

to not engage in any misconduct of any character in the future.

6

The defense based sentencing report gives a recommend-

As both reports produced indicate,

7

ation cf 36 mon~hs of probation, 270 days of County Jail time,

8

with 6 days credit.

9

it is incredibly likely that this defendant will never appear

10

before the Court again with regards co anything of this char-

11

acter.

12

ing to Dr. Mahea's report.

As indicated in our sentencing report,

He has practically no risk of a repeat offense, accord-

13

Now, of course, those are not words not Dr. Mahea's

14

specifically, but th~ report essentially suggests exactly as

15

I've indicated.

16

before you a young man who has -- who has engaged in misconduct

17

that is egregious, significantly egregious, and yet he has

18

taken full responsibilicy for it, has acknowledge his role,

19

has acknowledged his culpability, has acknowledged that it

20

was wrong, and has assumed the necessary steps for purposes

21

of changing all of his lifestyle behavior that would prevent

22

him from engaging in anything of this character in the future.

The point is, your Honor, is is that we find

23

24

I heartily recommend that the Court consider the 270

25

days of jail time tha: is involved in the defense based sent-
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1

encing report, with credit fer the 6 days.

2

the AP& P report recommends a comrr1i tmcnt of a 1 to 15,

3

degree felony.

4

I recognize that
second-

I also recognize that both the defense based and the

5

AP&P reports indicate thac he is in the moderate risk category;

6

but the extenuating circums:ances that we have suggested to the

7

Court would tend to appropriately sway the Court toward the

8

probation.

9

With that we would submit.

Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Thank you.

10

MR. LONG: If I might just add, your Honor, :hat I've

11

known Bob for the last two-and-a-half years.

12

met him it had been about a year, I think, since the incident

13

happened.

14

So I suggested he put on a scram device, which he did, and he's

15

been wearing that for I guess in excess of two years.

16

When I first

r rec -- he said he hadn't had a drink since then.

We sent him up and he did a whole sexual -- psycho-

17

sexual evaluation with Dr. Mahea and has followed the treatment

18

regimen for the last two-plus years.

Is that right?

19

MR. MAGNESS: Almost two-and-a-half years.

20

MR. LONG: So he's been very compliant. He went through

21

his Great Life training and bonded with a lot of people over

22

there, 220 hours.

23

Honor before sentencing.

24

25

I think he'd like to say something to your

THE COURT: All right, do you want to do that now or
after the Sta~e?
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1

MR. LONG: Go ahead and let the State --

2

THE COURT: Whatever -- whatever (inaudible).

3

MR. LONG: Let him go ahead.

4

MR. FLATER: Than% you, your Honor.

I think the pre-

5

sentence report does a good job of identifying some of the

6

things that are very concerning in this case.

7

the defendant did not know the victim prior to this crime is

8

indicating as an aggravating factor and circumstance.

The fact that

9

The fact that he took advantage of an unconscious and

10

particularly vulnerable individual and used that vulnerability

11

to satisfy his own sexual desire I think is significant and

12

extremely aggravating circumstances in this particular case.

13

The Court is aware and it's been the subject of much

14

discussion that the victim is requesting prison.

15

think is significant that she wants him to be in prison for as

16

long as she's really kind of suffered through and dealt with

17

the consequences of his actions; a~d suggested tha~ a minimum

18

of two years of prison would be appropriate for what he did to

19

her is essentially the price to pay for the egregious behavior

20

that he engaged in.

21

Her request I

I don't disagree with the pre-sentence report or the

22

victim.

23

that there were initial negotiations that didn't involve me.

24

As the party I do believe that I am bound to honor the request,

25

but the Sta=e's prior position was we want to -- we want to

I think their .recommendations are a9propriate.

I knm•1
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1

honor the wishes of the victim in this particular case.

2

think her recor.1.mendat.ions and t.he recomrnendations in the pre-

3

sentence ~eport are appropriate.

So I

4

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

5

MR. LONG: I j~st might add that although she requested

6

two-and-a-half years in prison, the information we have on the

7

analysis is that the average first offender served 91 months on

8

a sex offense (inaudible} prison.

9

to say something on his

01,-m

But Mr. Magness would like

behalf.

10

TH8 COURT: All right, thank you.

11

MR. MAGNESS: I'm accountable, your Honor.

I can't

12

believe I did such a stupid thing.

13

of Great Life training.

14

because I was pretending I was a victim.

15

well for family which I love, and they love me, and a career

16

as a welder that I've had since I was 12.

17

trust me, the results will speak for themselves.

18

I realize I've given up all power

also in the pre-sentence report.

20

that means?

21

pretending I was a victim."

23

24

25

I'm compelled to do

If your Honor will

THE COURT: Okay, that quote that you just used is

19

22

I've been through 120 hours

Could you let me know what

''I have thrcwn away all my power because I was
I'm not exactly sure I understand.

MR. MAGNESS: I've given up all my power because I was
pretending I was a victim.

I'm not

MR. PARSONS: Simply assuming -- if I may, your Honor,
simply assuming responsibility completely, himself.
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1
2

THE COURT: So just initially -- I guess I'm not understand:ng.

3

MR. PARSONS: If the Court had the -- should the Court

4

have had the privilege of receiving testimony, the Court would

5

have determined that at the time of the initial interviews by

6

the au~horities there were conflicting statements made.

7

THE COURT: I'm aware of that.

8

MR. ?ARSONS: That's what he's suggesting is --

9

THE COURT: All right, that he did take responsibility.

10

]1

12
13

We accually had

MR. ?ARSONS: He's taking -- yes, he's acknowledging
full responsibility at this time.

Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right, tha~k you.

Anything -- anything

more I should know?

14

MR. MAGNESS: Nothing.

15

THE COURT: All right.

16

MR. MAGNESS: No, your Honor.

i7

THE COURT: All right, well, we've met a number of

18

times through this.

19

a the :wo hearings previously when we were -- one of the times

20

that we were set for sentencing.

21

As you recall, the victim did testify at

At that time (inaudible) numerous references to her

22

statements today that she wants Mr. Magness to go to prison

23

for the amount of ti~e that she has suffered.

24

that we all need to keep in pe=spective and that she will learn

25

likely as well, that she likely will suffer a lot more than che

I think the part
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1

two-and-a-half years that she has suffered ~o date.

2

using the two-and-a-half year number is really not helpful.

3

So I think

I appreciate all the hard work that you have committed

4

yourself to during this time pericd.

5

unacce~table conduct, and the victim in this case has suffered

6

and will continue to suffer a great deal.

7

before me on a second-degree felony, and for that you will be

8

sentenced to the Utah State Prison for 1 to 15 years.

9

Restitutio~ is ordered.

~owever, I'm -- this is

So, sir, you are

I don't know if we have

10

f~nal ~estitution numbers.

11

numbers, but is that something that the State --

12

I know there's two different claim

MR. FLATER: I'm not prepared to address a final amount

13

of restitution today.

14

matter open for a pe~iod of time so we can --

15

16
17

! would just ask the Cour: to keep that

THE COURT: All right, we can try to address it here or
we can have the board address it.

So I don't do --

MR. FLATER: I would just ask the Court to order resti-

18

tution as a condition of his sentence.

19

of the information tha: we --

20

21

22
23

Then we will submit all

THE COURT: All right, thank you.
ordered as well.

So restitution is

A~ything further?

KR. PARSONS: May Mr. Magness self-report on Friday at
5 o'clock?

24

THE COURT: No, he'll be taken into custody now.

25

(Hearing concluded)
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sentencing and gives basis.' State objects to a continuance and gives basis.
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I
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I

'
I
Printed: 05/13/15 14:04:27

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Paqe

Q.0~6

2

Case No: 131903746 Date:

May 11, 2015

fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for
transportation to the Utah.State Prison where the defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Court orders the defendant;to serve 1-15 years prison forthwith.
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